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Abstract 
Application of machine learning in the field of malware analysis is not a new concept, there 
have been lots of researches done on the classification of malware in android and windows 
environments. However, when it comes to malware analysis in the internet of things (IoT), it 
still requires work to be done. IoT was not designed to keeping security/privacy under 
consideration. Therefore, this area is full of research challenges. This study seeks to evaluate 
important machine learning classifiers like Support Vector Machines, Neural Network, 
Random Forest, Decision Trees, Naive Bayes, Bayesian Network, etc. and proposes a 
framework to utilize static feature extraction and selection processes highlight issues like over-
fitting and generalization of classifiers to get an optimized algorithm with better 
performance.  For background study, we used systematic literature review to find out research 
gaps in IoT, presented malware as a big challenge for IoT and the reasons for applying malware 
analysis targeting IoT devices and finally perform classification on malware dataset. The 
classification process used was applied on three different datasets containing file header, 
program header and section headers as features. Preliminary results show the accuracy of over 
90% on file header, program header, and section headers. The scope of this document just 
discusses these results as initial results and still require some issues to be addressed which may 
effect on the performance measures. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In the last few years, the internet has started playing a vital role in everyone’s life when the 
concept of “Internet of Things” (IoT) emerged. IoT has fundamentally changed the paradigm 
of traditional information technology (IT) to a new era of innovation involving sensor chips. In 
a concise time, the current conceptualization of IoT led to deploying over 9 billion 
interconnected devices in the market; this figure is expected to rise to 24 billion in 2020, it 
seems like nearly everything will become connected in future for effective communication 
(Gubbi et al., 2013). With the increased connectivity of the internet with all the luxuries, IoT 
devices bring the concept of security to the consumer (e.g., controlling home automation). This 
development of technology makes their hectic life enjoyable and under controlled. For 
instances, the idea of the customized theme in smart-lights is a best example of  an IoT device, 
another concept of smart fridges with content management not only gives the consumer a useful 
real-time experience, but it also provides a flexible solution for this busy generation. Ease of 
life made IoT as an inevitable reality of life what we could only think in the early 80's. Now 
researchers claim that IoT devices are the first choice of the consumers. Therefore, an enormous 
number of IoT devices are getting developed, according to a survey the total number of smart 
IoT devices are expected to reach the figure of approximately 50 billion in 2020 and an estimate 
of over 75 billion in 2025. With the rise of IoT associated insecurities have also evolved rapidly 
in the form of malware, denial of service attacks (DoS) and botnets. Figure 1 shows the 
evolution of famous malicious attempts (Nordrum, Aug 2016, IHS, 2016).  
In recent years,  cybercriminals have developed malware targeting these IoT devices. Imagine! 
Your smart fridge sends fake content update requests to your local Tesco, you receive a bill that 
you were not supposed to pay, or your smart home meter has been infected by malware which 
is sending wrong meter reading, it would cause insecurity to the users and lack of trust to the 
product or service provider. Different kind of malware targeting IoT device, Figure 2 
summarises some common malware attacks. 
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Figure 1: History of malware 
 
Figure 2: Common malware attacks 
Mirai is a recent example of IoT malware which converts its target into a Botnet. Mirai got the 
focus of researcher’s attention for targeting more than 148k IoT devices, making CCTV 
cameras and DVR recorders running on ports 23 and 2323 particularly and turning them into 
Botnets to cause Distributed Denial of Service Attack (Angrishi, 2017). To complicate the 
situation, malware authors used techniques to camouflage the primary activity of a malware 
causing more damage to the infected devices. Therefore, there is a significant need to employ 
malware detection techniques which incorporate Data Mining and Machine Learning 
Algorithms to enhance the detection capability.  
Over the last one decade, plenty of research has been conducted in the field of malware analysis; 
all proposed techniques had some limitations leaving billions of devices still vulnerable to new 
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malware. Therefore, we need research which predominantly focuses on enhancing automated 
malware analysis using potentially malicious IoT executables that detect their malicious 
activities with the help of classification and prediction for better performance. 
1.1 - Problem statement 
Malware have been threatening the privacy of internet users for a very long time, with every 
day passing cybercriminals are using advanced programming skills to create more destructive 
malware. A malware of any class contributes to the revenue loss to the society. Recently, in a 
study, it was claimed that in 2016 the famous attack on Dyn (Oracle’s infrastructure service 
provider company specializing in DNS and Email related services) by Mirai Botnet caused a 
revenue loss of $110 million (Kochetkova, 2016). The damage did not stop here, author of the 
malware released its source code on GitHub leaving the doors open for more powerful attacks.  
IoT malwares have special features that enable them to run on huge range of architectures and 
target multiple platforms. Of course, this special feature makes the IoT malware a smarter form 
of malware, however, IoT malwares also take the advantage of weaknesses present in IoT 
devices such as firmware loopholes, no encryption mechanism etc. and exploit these weakness 
in a clever way. These malwares have an ability to scan heterogeneous devices using open ports, 
hostile these devices by applying various commands /or saved default usernames / or passwords 
in their database. Furthermore, another feature that contribute to make it different from other 
malwares is the instruction set to avoid IPs of Government Agencies.  
 
Billions of IoT devices are already present in the market on vast number of architectures. Main 
weak point of these devices is their resource constrained nature. Due to rapid growth in their 
importance and the weaknesses present, these devices soon became a prime target of malware 
attacks. It has also been noted from published work that there have been numerous ongoing 
studies done in Windows and Mobile devices related malware mainly involving Android. 
Unfortunately, this area did not get much attention and till this date there is no published 
literature available to analyse malware with respect to IoT. This research work attempts to 
systematically review the literature to study the vulnerabilities reported in IoT and how these 
are related to malware attacks. This work also aims to analyse IoT malware and work focused 
on various distinct directions of malware analysis. First such direction was the collection of IoT 
malware/goodware. Second was extraction of meta-information, headers, strings, and symbols 
etc. Another direction was classification of malware with the help of machine learning.  The 
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study gives us insight useful information about the patterns of IoT malware/goodware, 
classification and prediction. 
Furthermore, there is no optimum framework for the classification of IoT application. 
Additionally, no work has been done to observe generalization of classifiers, hyper tuning the 
parameters (to figure out best parameter for a chosen algorithm) and analyze whether a 
particular classifier is overfitting or not? These factors motivate us to carry out work in this 
domain.  
1.2 - Research aims and objectives 
Based on the literature reviewed it is clear that further studies into IoT malware are needed. The 
proposed project will investigate the published literature through the bibliometric approach and 
summarize the gaps reported in the previous section of the problem statement, IoT 
environments suffer malware detection, classification, prediction and pattern recognition. 
Meanwhile, we can also observe the lack of application of feature scoring algorithms which can 
be used for feature selection. Here, I will not discuss the individual status of static or dynamic 
features of IoT malware; both require comprehensive research. In the light of this, the 
dissertation has three overriding objectives: 
1. Malware as a severe threat to IoT: To review the literature to identify what kind of threats 
and vulnerabilities being faced by IoT devices. And how it becomes security, privacy, and 
trust related concern. 
2. Systematically review the literature: To capitalize on public available malware detection 
tools and libraries of machine learning algorithms for data mining to support annotation of 
critical malware in IoT for which no information is available.  
3. IoT malware analysis: To conduct IoT malware analysis using selected classifiers (shown 
in figure 3) and by observing optimum parameters. Sub-objectives are following: 
a) To study the results using a minimum number of features determined with the help of 
feature reduction/scoring techniques.  
b) To evaluation different feature scoring techniques and choosing best feature 
selection/reduction method for our datasets. 
c) To analyze the performance of the algorithms using false positive rates, overfitting issues 
and most importantly analyze the generalization of the algorithms. 
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Figure 3: Showing how we reached at the stage of static malware analysis 
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1.3 - Research contribution 
This section discusses the research contributions; figure 4 shows the representation of our 
research contributions. Supervised learning-based machine learning algorithms help to 
predict/determine relevant IoT malware features (only static features). These relevant features 
also help to detect different patterns of the applications being analyzed and create a logical 
linking between good or bad, predicting the ability of the malware attack on the basis of feature 
ranking and provide a coherent framework to classify the differences between malware and 
goodware.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Proposed research stages for static malware analysis with machine learning 
 
17 | P a g e  
 
This section presents the research contribution and personal commitment. In addition to this, 
these contributions also help to perform the comparative analysis between IoT malware and 
goodware (malware belonging to UNIX System V malware family and clean ELF executables 
collected from Raspberry Pi based Qemu emulator) and also to differentiate between them by 
a minimum set of features. Therefore, we propose providing an optimum framework for 
malware classification and evaluation using selected classifiers. In other words, the 
recommended tool to help better prediction by involving a comparative analysis of various 
feature selection methods as well. I would explain these research contributions in more detail 
in later sections.  
The rest of the document can be structured as follows: Chapter 2 contains information about 
malware analysis primarily static malware analysis and background literature review of static 
malware analysis. Chapter 3 (Data Collection and The Proposed Approach) describes research 
methodology to achieve research aims and objectives, while CHAPTER FOUR: Research 
Planning.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
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Chapter 2. Literature review 
The overall aim of the literature review is to perform background study of existing literature 
related to the internet of things, its related challenges, identify the research gaps to understand 
the theoretical and conceptual framework of the research in question. The presentation of 
literature being reviewed in chronological order helps to observe the quality of work, its growth, 
current gaps in the knowledge and future progress. Therefore, a literature review can be treated 
as an essential part of the research used to remodel the elements of the work done and create 
the basis of future work (Webster and Watson, 2002). 
2.1 - Internet of Things 
In simple words internet of things (IoT) consists of two important elements “internet” and 
“things.” The name IoT was first used in 1999 in which radio frequency (RF) application 
extension took place forming the basis of IoT infrastructure (Khodadadi et al., 2017). During 
early days of the introduction of IoT, RF chips used to be the force behind IoT but later on 
replaced by wireless sensor chips. There are various definitions of IoT in the literature as shown 
in table 1.  
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Table 1: Showing some definitions of IoT 
Definition Ref 
“A network of objects which revolves around three pillars of the internet, 
sensors, and knowledge in such a way that there is always an intersection in the 
applicability.” 
(Atzori et 
al., 2010) 
“A network of things, interconnecting with the help of sensors, actuators, data 
analytics and cloud computing to exchange the information and bring 
innovative solutions via unified frameworks.” 
(Gubbi et 
al., 2013) 
“An environment that utilizes the information and enabling technologies to 
make infrastructure, its components and makes various services interactive, 
more aware and efficient.” 
(Bélissent, 
2010) 
A network of actively interacting, communicating, exchanging information and 
anonymously behaving things in information and social environments. 
(Al-Fuqaha 
et al., 2015) 
A network in which things with unique identities and virtual personalities 
operating with the help of intelligent interfaces and network protocols to enable 
them to interconnect and communicate with each other. 
(Vermesan 
et al., 2011, 
Singh et al., 
2014) 
IoT can also be defined as a self-configuring global network which is based on 
protocols that are standard and interoperable. Furthermore, the connected 
objects have identities/physical attributes and consist of intelligent interfaces 
incorporated to form an information network. 
(Van 
Kranenburg, 
2008, Ray, 
2016) 
Based on above-mentioned definitions, IoT can be considered as a complex cyber-physical 
ecosystem with following six characteristics: (i) Dynamic infrastructure; (ii) Self-configuring; 
(iii) Well integrated; (iv) Interoperable; (v) Identities and physical attributes; (vi) Intelligent 
Interfaces. 
These six characteristics make a “smart device” that is considered as a significant part of the 
scientific revolution. The tremendous growth in smart IoT devices and their innovative features 
is self-evident of their importance. IoT technology became more promising when researchers 
claimed that in the future every ordinary device will be transformed into a smart device and IoT 
will turn into Internet of Everything (IoE).  
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Along with the rise of IoT, top technology giants have also started focusing towards it for 
example Google acquired Nest to step into smart home automation business, Apple introduced 
HomeKit and Cisco launched various products in the areas of network connectivity, data 
analytics, embedded systems, security and digital transformation (DevNet) and made a bold 
statement that IoT market worth at least 14 trillion dollars (Dijkman et al., 2015).  This is the 
beginning as numerous European companies are making their products in the areas of health 
care, energy and in the vehicle industry, etc. Furthermore, the good thing about IoT is that 
researchers have started performing quality research in it and trying to address associated 
challenges of security, privacy and in particular malware threats. As of now, research scientists 
continue to produce high-quality technical approaches including Robotics, Cloud Computing, 
Big Data and development of IoT machine learning frameworks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Illustrating the characteristics of IoT 
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2.2 – Architecture of IoT 
Due to billions of heterogeneous IoT devices, all proposed IoT architectures in the literature 
have considerable variations. There is no single consensus on IoT architecture, and everyone is 
agree with this statement (Sethi and Sarangi, 2017). Consequently, researchers often described 
the architecture based on their study purpose.  
Generic architecture 
The most basic architecture of IoT devices consists of three layers (Figure 1): 
(i) Physical or Perceptive layer or remote sensing layer: this layer is responsible for 
sensing and collecting information about the environment. It has the ability to sense the 
physical parameters or identify the other objects present in the environment.  
(ii) Network or communication layer: this layer is responsible for the communication by 
connecting with other smart things, network devices, and servers. This layer provides 
the means of data transmission by processing the sensor data.  
(iii) Application layer or software layer: this layer is responsible for communicating with 
the end-user to deliver various application-specific services and defines various IoT 
applications that can be deployed.  
This underlying architecture was introduced in the early stage of research in the field of IoT 
(Jammes and Smit, 2005, Yan and Huang, 2009), but this kind of architecture is not sufficient 
to provide in-depth aspects of IoT for the advanced research (Sethi and Sarangi, 2017). 
Therefore, detailed, layered architecture has been proposed in the literature where some 
researchers have also included some additional layers (Figure 1): (i) physical layer; (ii) transport 
layer: (iii) processing layer; (iv) application layer; and (v) business layer. The roles of physical 
layer, network layer, and application layer are same as the three-layer architecture, and other 
layers have been described below (Rayes and Salam, 2017, Sethi and Sarangi, 2017, Bozdogan 
and Kara, 2015).   
(iv) Transport layer: transport layer is responsible for transferring the sensor data from the 
physical layer to the processing layer through networks (such as wireless, 3G, LAN, 
Bluetooth, RFID, and NFC) to perform network operations and identify the connected 
devices.  
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(v) Processing layers: processing layer is the middle layer that is responsible for 
performing multiple functions such as storing data, analyzing data and processing data 
that comes from the transport layer.  Many enabling technologies such as cloud 
computing, big data processing modules and database management, etc. are 
incorporated to provide a diverse set of services.  
(vi) Business layers: business layer is responsible for managing whole IoT system including 
user details, applications, etc.  
 
Figure 6: IoT architectural layers 
Advanced architecture 
In a recent article, another architecture has been proposed which is a somewhat advanced form 
of IoT. This architecture consists of seven layers, e.g. (i) application layer; (ii) application 
support and management layer; (iii) service layer; (iv) communication layer; (v) network layer; 
(vi) hardware layer; (vii) environment layer, etc.  
Advanced architecture 
In a recent article, another architecture has been proposed which is a somewhat advanced form 
of IoT. This architecture consists of seven layers, e.g. (i) application layer; (ii) application 
support and management layer; (iii) service layer; (iv) communication layer; (v) network layer; 
(vi) hardware layer; (vii) environment layer, etc.  
2.3 – IoT environment 
The key objectives of IoT devices are (i) To exchange secure and reliable information between 
connected devices; (ii) To identify the relevant objects; and (iii) To take part as an essential 
element in ubiquitous/mobile communication. These three objectives collectively form an IoT 
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environment (IE). The IoT devices with multiple architectural layers, associated protocols and 
enabling technologies to increase the heterogeneity in the IoT environment. It creates a model 
where numerous smart things or objects connected with each other by using compatible 
wired/wireless networks. The multiple interactions bring interoperability to the environment 
and help to reach common objectives for various IoT user-specific applications (Figure 7). 
IoT environment typically consists of six important features (Al-Fuqaha et al., 2015): 
(a) Identification: Identification is an essential feature of IoT. There are various techniques to 
identify a smart thing/object within the IE such as unique object code (present at the hardware 
level) (Koshizuka and Sakamura, 2010) and unique addresses, e.g. IPv4or IPv6 present at 
network layers (Al-Fuqaha et al., 2015).  
(b) Sensing: In the IoT, sensing feature means communicating with IoT device, gathering data 
and report it back to the data handling or storing mechanism. Example of sensors/communicator 
is smart sensors, actuators, and radio frequency tags. 
(c) Communication services: These features help IoT devices to connect with each other and 
provide various services while working in a low power mode and establishing a communication 
channel to send or receive the information to the sensor. Typical examples of communication 
services include Zigbee, Z-wave, WIFI etc.  
(d) Hardware/software: IoT environment uses various hardware platforms and operating 
systems software to manage individual IoT devices, the combination of both these referes to as 
a computation platform or a controller. There are various examples of IoT hardware platforms 
like Intel Edison, Intel Galileo and Raspberry Pi etc, while Contiki OS, TinyOS etc are the 
examples of operating systems or softwares. 
(e) Services: IoT devices, protocols and enabling technologies work on interoperability 
framework for providing various services explained in following section. 
(f) Semantic: This feature creates an ability to extract information from an IoT device and 
apply knowledge representation techniques to bring sense into a raw data delivered by the 
sensor. Semantic services bring intelligence into IoT by using data analytics. Example of IoT 
semantic is Semantic Web Ontology (SWO) 
 
25 | P a g e  
 
Figure 7: IoT Environment containing architectural layers and protocols for bringing interoperability among IoT devices and applications where 
various IE features facilitate this 
process. 
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2.4 – IoT ecosystem and the world of connected services 
The world of IoT is redefining the relationship between the machines and humans; it allows 
the automation of everything around us. IoT devices and its enabling technologies are working 
on interoperability framework where they exchange information with each other and coordinate 
decisions and making a smart “cyber-physical ecosystem” (ENISA, 2017). This is an 
innovative ecosystem with billions of heterogeneous physical devices manufactured around the 
world to improve quality of life, efficiency, productivity, profitability, effectiveness, and 
decision-making. The application of the IoT devices is diverse, distributed into various services 
and benefitting ordinary people, industrialists, governments, health professionals, energy 
providers in simple words everyone. Pictorial view in Figure 8 illustrates the proliferation of 
devices and most exciting applications within different services.  
2.4.1. Smart Energy 
Smart energy is the conversion of a traditional energy distribution system that consists of some 
distribution lines, substations, transformers and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) field devices and converts into modern networks that are not only smart, intelligent 
but also having the default capabilities of information exchange, maintainability and easy 
interoperability of individual components (Sajid et al., 2016). The examples of smart energy 
include UPS, batteries, generators, fuel cells, ambient energy harvesting, telemetry, power 
stations, smart grid and power controls, etc. (Fraga-Lamas et al., 2016). Among these smart 
grid is a popular application of IoT which consists of devices such as meters (gas, electric and 
water) and other energy appliances. Traditional energy transmission/distribution systems used 
to be unidirectional, smart grid makes them intelligent to sense the transmission requirements 
to avoid the congestion, effective communication between the utility services and the customer. 
Moreover, there are specific advantages smart grid gives to the users, for example, the efficient 
transmission, congestion control, smarter restoration of energy, less hassle to maintain, 
controlled peak hour energy supply and better integration of various controls (Min et al., 2014). 
Smart grid consists of four major components including power plants (source), transmission 
(energy transfer in bulk from power source generators and the sub-station), distribution (a 
connection between power source and the customer), customer area to generate store power at 
home or anywhere and service provider to deliver the energy products to end-users (Min and 
Varadharajan, 2015). 
27 | P a g e  
 
Figure 8: The Internet of Things (IoT) - The World of Connected Services
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2.4.2. Smart Home 
Smart home or smart living is often referred to as Home Area Network (HAN) is the 
incorporation of communication techniques to form a network that connects the essential home 
appliances and services like lighting, heating, air conditioning and security in such a way that 
they can control and monitor these appliances anytime anywhere. These devices often use 
twisted pair cables and RF/IR sensor chips. Most importantly many of the device use mains 
power and use a gateway or controller to manage (connection and authentication) for all the 
devices associated with the home network (Jiang et al., 2004). 
There have been numerous smart home devices in the market these days; prominent “smart” 
home devices include pen, wardrobes, table, lamp, picture frame, fridges/freezers, bed, pillow, 
digital cameras, power system, dishwasher, e-readers, smart utility meters, greenhouses and 
home surveillance system (Alvarez et al., 2017). 
2.4.3. Smart Buildings 
Incorporating energy management system (EMS) and security/safety systems within the 
building is the key aspect of smart building. It is useful for competitive management of 
resources, improve building visibility and manageability. It provides tools to reduce the 
operational cost and provide cost-effective benefits to the consumers, employees, and tenants. 
It also brings intelligent IoT ecosystem that includes sensor and gateway vendors, system 
integrators and application developers (Shenoy, 2016).    
2.4.4. Smart Health 
IoT being a game-changer in every industry playing its role in the healthcare sector as well by 
transforming healthcare into smart healthcare or connected health in which all medical 
appliances are always connected to give more useful and important information about patients. 
The healthcare market is going to hit 117 billion USD in 2020. With the help of connected 
health we may get the benefit of efficient risk analysis and healthcare asset management, drug 
management, monitoring for patients and hospitals e.g., smart pills a major contribution 
towards smart healthcare in which patient’s clinical trials, activity monitoring, and self-
reporting is performed and finally early medical intervention for critically ill patients (Patel et 
al., 2017, Weinberg et al., 2015). 
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2.4.5. Smart Wearables 
Smart wearables include medical appliances, fitness equipment, and smartwatches help to 
monitor not only the health of the patients but also lets the athletes to maintain their routine 
fitness chart. According to Cisco till 2020, there will be at least 600 million smart-wearables 
used around the globe (Sun et al., 2017a). Smart wearables play an essential role in IoT world, 
according to the researchers, the reliance of people-centric aspect of IoT is heavily on these 
wearables to handle remote objects (Liu and Sun, 2016). There have been various products in 
the market, e.g., Samsung Gear and Fitbit, etc. are the widely used products. These intelligent 
devices have low-constrained architecture particularly the sensors.  
2.4.6. Smart Security and defense 
Various IoT devices are getting deployed throughout the cities that are undeniably transforming 
the public safety aspects. Wherever unplanned, emergency events and catastrophic disasters 
occur in the cities, these devices enable the interoperability and transform the critical 
information to the organization who deals with scenarios in which defense and public safety 
could influence and respond to emergency events (Fraga-Lamas et al., 2016).  
2.4.7. Smart Retail 
Another implementation of IoT concepts where analytical abilities, predicted outcomes and 
efficient results help retail industry. Smart retail includes supply chain, in-store applications, 
and customer specific applications as well. It helps to identify when the certainty customer 
needs help. Furthermore, smart retail also helps (i) identifying when there a maintenance 
required on a retail machine, (ii)  transportation of merchandise by intelligently optimizing the 
route, tracking and temperature control, (iii) making retail warehouses automated by 
monitoring sales, stock levels and smart pallets which automatically report missing stock, (iv) 
proactive customer focus to identify when a customer needs an incentive as a highly valued 
customer retention scheme or autonomous doorstep product delivery and (v) to help to monitor 
automatic foot count for retail stores, analyse that information with other stores and re-
modelling store to maintain customers (SAS). 
2.4.8. Smart Industries 
The concept of smart industries or industrial internet (II) was introduced by a company called 
GE, according to this concept complex machinery is used along with RF sensors and software 
forming a specialized IoT environment (Greenough and Camhi, 2015). II is a complex 
environment which widely uses machine learning, big data, and both homogeneous and 
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heterogeneous device communication as enabling technologies giving high-performance 
analytics to the users (Kevin, 2009, Jeff Kelly, 2013). With the evolution in IoT, data from the 
government is getting readily available to relevant people and with the help of industrial 
internet and big data analytics people can handle raw information and transform into more 
structured and valuable form of knowledge (Lohr, 2012). The examples of industrial devices 
ready for transformation into II include Pumps, Valves, Conveyors, Pipelines, Motors, and RF 
Sensors, etc. 
2.4.9. Smart Transportations 
In recent years, some cities have become more crowded, and millions of people commute 
through public transports on a daily basis. Integration of IoT into transportation system helps 
to optimize public transportation routes, assess congestions and plan safer roads for the journey 
by avoiding traffic congestions and reduce infrastructure costs (Gubbi et al., 2013) 
Connected cars are another important IoT applications, vehicles connected with their gateways 
with the help of WLANs providing drivers benefits, e.g. automatic breakdown support, location 
services, driver assistance, entertainment, eHealth and fitness and advanced road traffic 
assistance in case of an incident (Kirk, 2015).  Recently the CEO of Apple Tim Cook confirmed 
about the work on self-driving cars and the ability of Apple mobile devices to control the 
vehicles (Harris, 2015) which may give IoT another dimension to enable car to car 
communications, interaction with smart traffic lights, and most important connection with 
external access points (Bonomi et al., 2012). By 2020, it has been reported that approximately 
75% of cars worldwide will be IoT enabled (Javed et al., 2018). For the public transportation, 
the concept of smart taxi system has also been introduced. Furthermore, another use of smart 
transportation system can be in train services by providing smart ticket for data collection & 
analytics, the management of public safety/security and the inclusion of smart tablets with the 
drivers (Zanella et al., 2014).  
2.4.10. Smart IT & Network 
IoT is constantly offering new devices and tools that helps to interact and connect IT and 
network professionals to perform network administration, monitoring network traffic, status of 
nodes connected and software updates etc. to assess the status of working and delivering better 
solutions. Furthermore, IoT also helps network support teams to perform better network fault 
finding and tolerance, handle cloud services, effective network usage and manage 
organizational assets (Fraga-Lamas et al., 2016).   
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2.4.11. Smart Cities 
A smart city is a new vision of the technology that incorporates all infrastructures of a city into 
a controllable network. The infrastructure of a smart city may include almost everything for 
example homes, schools, streets (lights), hospitals, transportation system, gas/electric/water 
supplies and much more (Zanella et al., 2014). All of these technologies use different sort of 
gateways depending on the scope and use, but one thing in the smart city in comparison with 
other application is the use of cloud services for information exchange. With the advancement 
of IoT smart city has been emerged as an essential concept to bring comfort to the lives of 
residents of the town. Not only this, this idea has become a hub of other emerging technologies 
as well like data science (big data, malware threat analysis, and information governance) but 
also a complex challenge of heterogeneous and scalable computing challenges (Zhang et al., 
2017, Schaffers et al., 2011, Hernández-Muñoz et al., 2011). 
2.4.12. Smart Supply Chain 
IoT is bringing revolutionary advancements into supply chains and not only shaping up the 
industry but also solving the majority of the problems consumers face. With the rapid 
expansion in the business everyday organizations require smart solutions that make companies 
connect their systems efficiently, communicate with different businesses, share information 
and reinforce their sales/supply chains departments. Not only this, it can help customers in 
placement, delivery, and tracking of orders.  In addition to this, IoT can help consumers of 
supply chain products by introducing smart labeling system to give total control of the products. 
Therefore, with the help of IoT sensor chips, every aspect of supply chains can be controlled 
to provide efficient service (Javed et al., 2018, Kärkkäinen, 2003, McFarlane and Sheffi, 2003).  
2.4.13. Smart Agriculture 
In the last few decades, climate has been changed drastically that brings various challenges for 
local and global food security. Agricultural commodities are highly sensitive to climatic 
conditions such as temperature, rain, and humidity. These changes are likely to affect 
agriculture production (crops, fruits and vegetables, etc.) and livestock (fisheries, poultry 
farming, etc.). In this situation, it is prerequisite to monitor the climate change and utilize all 
available resources for sustainable agriculture production by monitoring and better resource 
utilization effectively which is only possible with the help of smart IoT devices (Javed et al., 
2018, Na and Isaac, 2016, Nukala et al., 2016). Smart agriculture system is an automated 
concept that has been recently introduced and getting worldwide attention. Thanks to IoT that 
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is making a significant contribution towards a better agriculture system people were looking 
for (Patil and Kale, 2016). 
2.5 –  Security and privacy challenges related to the IoT 
IoT is connecting more and more devices every day; this emerging technology promises to 
provide access to the devices anywhere to carry out everyday tasks using different IoT 
applications discussed in the previous section. This advancement offers undoubtedly several 
benefits to the humanity. Although IoT is playing a transformational role in the lives of people, 
on the other hand, it also brings a large number of challenges. Security, privacy, and trust are 
probably the most challenging issues in IoT, and various authors have extensively discussed 
them in published literature. In this section, we tried to collate a list of most important 
challenges reported in the literature; these challenges were divided into 24 key groups defined. 
This grouped taxonomy is depicted in figure 9, table 2 summarising the challenges and 
followed by an overview of each group defined.  
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Figure 9: Summary of IoT security, privacy and trust challenges 
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2.5.1. Access control:  
Access control let only authorized users to access a resource. It enables to control the software 
update, data sharing, maintenance and protection of sensitive data. Access control usually 
consists of three important building blocks: (i) access control mechanism; (ii) access control 
rules and (iii) access control management (Ouaddah et al., 2017). Due to the low power 
requirements and low constrained environment, access control is one of the major challenges 
in IoT (Alrawais et al., 2017a, Lin and Bergmann, 2016, Roman et al., 2013, Sicari et al., 2015, 
Pirbhulal et al., 2017, Yu et al., 2017, Tiburski et al., 2015, Ouaddah et al., 2017). 
Rules/policies/privileges for the access control are not well defined for most of the IoT devices. 
These rules are usually implemented on a high-level architecture which is ineffective due to 
resource constraints in most of the IoT devices. Without clear access control rules, access to 
the IoT devices get compromised that leads to more sophisticated attacks (Yaqoob et al., 2017, 
Ouaddah et al., 2017).  
 
35 | P a g e  
 
Table 2: Showing security, privacy and trust challenges: 
Group Challenge Finding and comments References 
Access control 
Access control rules 
Effective implementation of access control is only possible with 
the help of predefined rules, policies or privileges that are not well 
defined for IoT devices. Without clear access control rules, access 
to the IoT devices may get compromised. 
(Yaqoob et al., 2017, 
Zarpelão et al., 2017, 
Ouaddah et al., 2017) 
Access control mechanism and 
management 
Application of adequate access control is a critical element of 
information security that requires comprehensive work on its 
mechanisms and management system. Due to the low power and 
low constrained environment, access control is one of the major 
challenges in IoT. 
(Du and Chen, 2008, 
Zarpelão et al., 2017, 
Sicari et al., 2015, 
Ouaddah et al., 2017, 
Miorandi et al., 2012, 
Alrawais et al., 2017a, 
Pirbhulal et al., 2017) 
Authentication 
Lack of authentication 
protocols 
A large number of heterogeneous IoT devices being 
manufactured, their diverse protocols, poor architecture, and 
complex configuration makes implementation of authentication 
protocols a challenge. This deficiency causes more complex 
security and privacy issues. 
(Alrawais et al., 2017a, 
Amadeo et al., 2016, 
Zhang et al., 2013, Al-
Fuqaha et al., 2015, 
Tiburski et al., 2015, 
Venckauskas et al., 
2016b, Pirbhulal et al., 
2017, Sicari et al., 2015) 
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Anonymity and untraceability 
Heterogenous IoT devices are developed and distributed in the 
dynamic environment. The big challenge lies in the design and 
development of secure and privacy-preserving services that are 
not well-defined. Personally identifiable information has 
maximum disclosure due to anything, 
anytime and anywhere nature of the IoT that raises issues of 
anonymity and untraceability. Here anonymity refers to something 
that nobody knows about yourself or your real identity, while the 
untraceability refers that no one can predict your actions. 
(Gope and Hwang, 
2015, Challa et al., 
2017) 
CIA 
Confidentiality 
Confidentiality or privacy is a severe issue in IoT because of many 
reasons, e.g. the massive amount of data/traffic being generated, 
and the ineffectiveness of security controls, etc. The design and 
build of these devices have a limited sense of hiding the sensitive 
information from unauthorized people to view it.  
(Mendez et al., 2017, 
Tiburski et al., 2015, Liu 
and Sun, 2016, Lin and 
Bergmann, 2016, 
Pirbhulal et al., 2017, 
Maple, 2017, Sicari et 
al., 2015) 
Integrity 
The issues of IoT like fault tolerance, malware attacks and 
untrusted communication effect integrity of devices resulting in 
physical damage or unavailability of the resources. 
(Mendez et al., 2017, 
Tiburski et al., 2015, Liu 
and Sun, 2016, Lin and 
Bergmann, 2016, 
Pirbhulal et al., 2017, 
37 | P a g e  
 
Maple, 2017, Sicari et 
al., 2015, Juma et al., 
2008, Kwon et al., 2016) 
Availability 
Availability makes sure that resources are available for the use 
when needed. The availability of IoT resources becomes an issue 
when confidentiality and integrity of objects are compromised 
(e.g., malicious attacks etc.). It directly or indirectly affects CIA 
where availability of resources becomes a big challenge. 
(Mendez et al., 2017, 
Pirbhulal et al., 2017, 
Maple, 2017, Sicari et 
al., 2015) 
CIA of data being sensed and 
exchanged by ‘things.' 
CIA of data being sensed and exchanged means (i) a node is free 
from malware; (ii) no unconcerned party has access to data 
generated or stored; (iii) maintain the reliability and privacy of 
communication where sometimes both relevant and irrelevant 
information is kept as well. maintaining (i), (ii) and (iii) 
simultaneously without compromising CIA is a serious challenge. 
(Mayer, 2009, Liu and 
Sun, 2016, Juma et al., 
2008) 
Crisis 
management 
Response to security breaches 
unendurable business 
disruption. 
Maintaining uninterrupted and safe operation, even when the 
system is compromised is the highest priority target for the IoT 
industry.  
(Chiang and Zhang, 
2016) 
Cryptography IoT device message encryption 
A massive number of IoT devices increase network vulnerability. 
A process of encoding a message/information in a way that only 
authorized parties can access is a big challenge. 
(Al-Fuqaha et al., 2015) 
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Flexibility in a cryptographic 
algorithm 
Most of the IoT devices were designed without considering 
security and privacy. Moreover, IoT lacks flexibility in hardware 
operations and only support limited operations. The flexible 
cryptographic operations can give more support to hardware and 
offer better protection. These algorithms have not been 
implemented so far and require many efforts. 
(Amadeo et al., 2016, 
Ambrosin et al., 2016) 
Expensive cryptographic 
operations 
Cryptographic operations often require much more resources and 
computation power to implement which is a challenge in IoT. 
(Li et al., 2014a, Zhou et 
al., 2017) 
Implementation of 
cryptographic 
algorithms/protocols 
Cryptography techniques of storing/transmitting the data are 
concerned due to the architectural limitation of IoT.  IoT devices 
are based on either 8 or 16-bit architectures, and implementation 
of cryptographic algorithms for getting the right security is a 
challenge. 
(Ning et al., 2015, 
Venckauskas et al., 
2016a, Roman et al., 
2013) 
Key distribution and 
management 
The distribution and management of cryptographic keys is a 
critical issue when integrating cryptographic algorithms. If these 
keys are compromised then entire communication process may be 
disturbed. So there is a need to store keys at a safe/centralized 
location and distribute them when needed. 
(Xiao et al., 2017, 
Alrawais et al., 2017a, 
Bu et al., 2017, Ciccozzi 
et al., 2017, 
Venckauskas et al., 
2016a, Chandramouli et 
al., 2014) 
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Key revocation management 
Cryptographic key management becomes an issue in IoT due to 
the lack of key revocation techniques that may allow 
cybercriminals to utilize the keys obtained in the process of a 
system breach.  
(Ambrosin et al., 2016, 
Touati and Challal, 
2015, Chandramouli et 
al., 2014, Sawand et al., 
2015) 
Data privacy 
and protection 
Privacy 
(General, attacks, preservation, 
and privacy-preserving data 
mining) 
Data privacy is a major concern for the people which always 
requires preservation. The unrestricted access to the data poses 
significant security and privacy risks to consumers. The critical 
data privacy-challenges are: (i) most IoT devices fail to encrypt 
data that are being transferred; (ii) user sensitive information can 
be compromised due to unencrypted data. 
(Barki et al., 2016b, 
Mayer, 2009, Sicari et 
al., 2015, Wang et al., 
2014, Liu and Sun, 
2016, Ning et al., 2015, 
Pirbhulal et al., 2017) 
 
Data processing 
and computation 
 
Verification and computation 
of the outsourced data 
The process of outsourced data (a data produced or governed by 
another company) to the cloud to perform computational 
operations, and then request results may lead to security problems, 
e.g., password crack and DoS/DDoS attacks. Non-verified 
outsourced data in IoT lead to duplication of data or opens up 
doors for further complexities. 
(Yu et al., 2017, Liu et 
al., 2015) 
Data aggregation 
One of the biggest challenges in IoT is the gathering of 
unprecedented data generated from a multitude of devices every 
second. Due to multiple related issues with IoT like heterogeneity, 
complexity, an ever-increasing number of devices, data 
(Pandey et al., 2010, 
Sawand et al., 2015, 
Luong et al., 2016) 
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aggregation is an issue where both active and passive attacks, 
eavesdropping, lack of confidentiality/integrity/trust, etc. play an 
essential role to degrade the value of the precious data collected. 
Moreover, computation is more difficult when noisy or duplicated 
data is also present in the collection. 
Data processing 
A huge amount of unprecedented IoT data processing (i.e., 
acquiring and managing) is a challenge for the data analytics 
particularly when data is coming from multiple sensors, devices 
of complex configurations and various vendors, from outsourced 
companies, etc. The processing of massive data, elimination of 
ambiguities, noise and deduplication for processing without 
violating/harming data confidentiality and integrity is a very tough 
job. Processing or manipulation of data in this complex 
environment becomes an issue when data comes from edge 
devices in which computation and handling is a very tough 
challenge. 
(Mineraud et al., 2016, 
Alrawais et al., 2017a, 
Gaona-Garcia et al., 
2017, Luong et al., 
2016) 
Data retention 
IoT devices generate a massive amount of data every day and 
preservation of that data for continued storage,  for compliance or 
business reasons is a nightmare for organizations. Due to 
undefined/agreed governance laws defined by the government to 
(Kumarage et al., 2016, 
Rose et al., 2015) 
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help legal matters related to IoT, it is a challenge for the businesses 
to maintain a set standard for data retention. 
Data integrity because of 
malicious software 
Data integrity is a fundamental aspect of IoT security and 
reliability; a malware may cause issues related to data integrity in 
which an attacker may gain administrative permissions to make 
changes in the environment. 
(Kwon et al., 2016, 
Mendez et al., 2017) 
Data freshness 
Dealing with massive amount of data is a big challenge not only 
to store recent /relevant data without any adversaries replayed old 
messages but also manage the uncertainties in the data as well. 
(Pirbhulal et al., 2017, 
Jing et al., 2014, Islam 
et al., 2015, Chen et al., 
2009) 
False and noisy data collection 
Malicious attacks may cause issues (such as hardware failures or 
unreliable communication etc.). As a result IoT sensors may give 
noisy/false data. The resolution of this problem is an open issue. 
(Sawand et al., 2015, 
Mavromoustakis et al., 
2016, Chen et al., 2015) 
Insufficient computing 
resources 
IoT devices have limited computing resources especially when 
considering IoT enabled medical devices where authentication 
schemes employ complex algorithms that require more 
computational resources. The techniques that focus on the need to 
do any computation of data with limited resources are challenging 
to apply. 
(Yasin et al., 2017) 
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Secure data fusion 
The process of combining or synthesizing multiple data sources to 
produce more reliable information that is consistent and accurate 
as compared to the information provided by any individual data 
source is known as data fusion. The archival of data that is being 
generated in every second from in IoT and managing the 
dimension of uncertainty associated with data fusion is a big 
challenge.   
(Venckauskas et al., 
2016a, Chen et al., 
2009) 
Computational costs of the 
encryption and decryption 
In IoT environment, many copies of encrypted data get generated 
which requires a computational cost. This issue is also linked with 
the resource-constrained environment. 
(Xiao et al., 2017, 
Usman et al., 2017, Yu 
et al., 2017) 
Computation in mobile devices 
and cloud 
IoT devices are unable to deal with big size databases; these 
devices share their data with cloud environment get the advantage 
of computing. But due to the limitations of power, storage, and 
computation capabilities results obtained from cloud may get 
compromised. Therefore, there is a need for IoT devices to have 
onboard computing capabilities. 
(Yu et al., 2017) 
Verification of data 
deduplication 
In the cloud, there exist a lot of highly redundant data, which 
wastes the storage and bandwidth of the cloud servers. The 
correctness and verification of this redundant data is a significant 
challenge. 
(Yu et al., 2017, Yan et 
al., 2016a, Yan et al., 
2016b) 
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Secure information processing 
Processing of information in such a way that is only detectable by 
the analyst and provides a secure mechanism to avoid information 
mishandling when data is coming from numerous sources is a 
serious issue that may lead to privacy breaches. 
(Zhang et al., 2017) 
Digital forensics 
Diversity of devices 
IoT devices have a high diversity/heterogeneity (i.e., different 
operating systems, vendors, and methods of communication) 
making it difficult for traditional forensic tools to work. There is a 
continuous need to update these tools to support varied 
architecture of IoT to conduct the examination effectively. 
(Zulkipli et al., 2017) 
Lack of standardization 
Various authors have reviewed IoT challenges and proposed their 
solutions, yet they do not provide implementation guidelines that 
fit almost every scenario and their possible frameworks for future 
development in the area. 
(Harbawi and Varol, 
2017, Zulkipli et al., 
2017) 
Improper evidence handling 
IoT evidence has some important characteristics (i.e., they are 
volatile, fragile and with short lifespan) that make forensic 
examination difficult. These evidence can be easily tampered or 
even overwritten. Another issue is that, to collect/preserve 
evidence, IoT devices needed to be switched off to avoid change 
in metadata (i.e., accessed time), but it is not possible to shut down 
these devices. Therefore, investigators need to equip themselves 
with techniques to cope with these situations. 
(Zulkipli et al., 2017) 
44 | P a g e  
 
Evidence identification 
In IoT where data is coming from a variety of different sources 
(i.e., from different vendors, data centers, clouds or even from 
different countries), an important forensic challenge is not only to 
identify the potential sources of evidence but make them 
accessible as well which at the moment is impossible. This 
challenge becomes more complicated when we consider it in a 
relationship with interoperability, heterogeneity and scalability 
issues of IoT. 
(Harbawi and Varol, 
2017, Brown et al., 
2005, Quick and Choo, 
2014, Taylor et al., 
2010, Zulkipli et al., 
2017, Liu, 2015) 
Seizure or disposal of evidence 
IoT environments are full of both reliable and unreliable 
information in which seizure or disposal of crime scene evidence 
may also take place either by forensic experts or by cybercriminals 
to hinder the investigation process. Orientation and location of 
digital evidence at such places where the collection, disposal or 
seizure of the evidence may not possible makes forensic 
examination a challenging task. 
(Yakubu et al., 2016, 
Conlan et al., 2016, Liu, 
2015) 
Admissibility of evidence 
Researchers claim that the ever-increasing number of IoT devices 
and volume of data generated by them required more time to 
conduct the forensic investigation. On the other hand, the 
vulnerability of IoT creates doubts on the admissibility of 
evidence that is an open challenge. 
(Vlachopoulos et al., 
2013, Quick and Choo, 
2014, Sheldon, 2005) 
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Computing and traditional 
forensic tools 
Current forensic tools/techniques available for computation are 
not capable of dealing with IoT environment. 
(Zawoad and Hasan, 
2015) 
Evidence jurisdiction 
An important challenge in evidence collection is to handle 
jurisdiction issues where evidence is beyond the scope/reach of an 
investigator. In IoT environment, data roaming/ traveling is 
usually possible particularly when cloud computing is involved 
which makes it impossible for an investigator to identify, collect, 
seize, or dispose of evidence (i.e., a country having ownership of 
specific evidence may refuse to handover it to the investigator 
from another country). 
(Oriwoh and Sant, 2013, 
Zulkipli et al., 2017, 
Liu, 2015) 
Application of forensic 
procedures 
There are six steps involved in digital forensics examination with 
clear guideline to apply but when it comes to IoT, there are a lot 
of factors that make the forensic investigation tough challenge to 
use (i.e., massive amount of data generated/exchanged between 
devices, volume of the heterogeneous devices in the network and 
various other factors). In this scenario, evidence finding 
(identification, preservation, and collection) requires extra 
research efforts to apply whole forensic framework under 
extraordinary constrained environment of IoT. 
(Zulkipli et al., 2017) 
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Heterogeneous 
interactions 
Diverse protocols, technologies 
that create a complex 
configuration 
Usage of various protocols and mixture of heterogeneous 
technology cause configuration issues requiring considerable 
attention. Furthermore, cybersystems have various kinds of 
interactions between entities, these interactions are not limited to 
cyber and physical characteristics but also include social 
attributes, which are particularly crucial for across-space 
interactions. 
(Kim, 2017, Gubbi et 
al., 2013, Ning et al., 
2013) 
Identity and 
access 
management 
(IAM) 
Cooperative authentication 
In mentioned literature cooperative authentication has been 
reported as a network security challenge in a smart community 
environment to filter false data traffic in the community network. 
(Ning et al., 2015, Li et 
al., 2011) 
Identity Fabrication (IF) 
An attacker may fabricate and create a fake identity, RFID identity 
can be duplicated or spoofed, and the existence of multiple 
identities is an issue. There is a need to differentiate between 
fake/fabricated or duplicated identities vs. original identities 
which is a very challenging task. 
(Ning et al., 2015, 
Roman et al., 2013, 
Babar et al., 2010, 
Meghanathan, 2010) 
Identity ownership 
Things or objects in the IoT often have a relationship to real 
persons and in many cases to other objects. These objects can be 
the owners, manufacturers, users, administrators, or many other 
functions. Ownership of objects and their identities becomes a 
critical challenge when they move from one network to another, 
(Ning et al., 2015, Lam 
and Chi, 2016) 
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in this case, the same object gets another owner. If this issue is not 
handled properly, the device can be compromised. 
Identity and authentication 
Mutual authentication is a critical issue in IoT when it comes to 
managing a large number of objects having a variety of data 
sources. For a trustworthy communication between devices, there 
should be a centralized authentication system which deals with 
object identities and provides the right level of authentication. 
(Roman et al., 2013, 
Mahalle et al., 2010) 
ID tracking 
In a heterogeneous environment where numerous smart devices 
are communicating, the process of tracing an object with the help 
of their identifiers is a crucial process. If handled, ID tracking may 
help in better asset handling, verification and audit process. 
Currently, this challenge is in debates. 
(Wang et al., 2014) 
Inadequate 
infrastructure or 
bad design 
Traditional centralized time-
synchronization protocols 
cannot be easily extended 
Application of traditional time synchronization protocols, e.g., 
network time protocol (NTP) centrally in the low constrained 
environment is difficult because of a diverse range of devices, and 
their extension to adopt security features is even harder. 
(Dong and Liu, 2015) 
Devices with low energy 
constraints 
IoT devices come with low-resources and limited battery power; 
this energy constraint becomes a challenge when applying security 
and privacy controls. 
(Venckauskas et al., 
2016b) 
Insecure booting process 
Boot process requires sensitive, trusted or verified and secure 
protection to avoid the device getting compromised or corrupted 
(Yaqoob et al., 2017) 
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while booting. Management of integrity metrics such as software 
and firmware in the boot process is not well designed at the 
developmental stage of IoT devices. It becomes a big challenge of 
the developmental process that leads to insecure booting process 
and may result in problems with device integrity metrics. 
Verifiable computing 
A challenge of fast-paced environment to develop security 
systems as a part of the architecture that verifies the computation 
performed. A significant problem in IoT is the lack of trust while 
performing data processing and computation when dealing with 
heterogeneous devices with a complex configuration. Under these 
circumstances verifiability while performing computation 
becomes a serious issue which requires immediate attention. 
(Alrawais et al., 2017a) 
Inadequate or 
limited support 
Lack of mature IoT 
technologies and business 
process 
Despite rapid growth in IoT based technologies, still, there is a 
lacking of maturity in the technologies and the business processes. (Kim, 2017) 
Lack of technical support 
IoT organizations consider the shortage of staff experienced in 
cybersecurity, hardware/software and data science, etc. to run IoT 
related projects efficiently. 
(Lin and Bergmann, 
2016) 
Lack of device authentication 
procedures 
IoT lacks device authentication procedures so that anonymous 
devices can be added by the attackers and 
scalability/heterogeneity makes it more challenging. 
(Yaqoob et al., 2017) 
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IoT malware  
Malware targeting different 
operating systems 
IoT devices support a variety of operating systems (i.e., ARM 
Mbed OS, Contiki and Windows 10 for IoT, etc.) and it has been 
noticed through published literature that majority of malware 
target Windows and Android operating systems. It is important to 
consider which operating system is being targeted by most of the 
attackers. To study malware targeting each IoT device, it is 
important to consider: (i) device architecture; (ii) firmware and 
(iii) operating system.  Unfortunately, there is not enough 
literature to cover this aspect.  
(Karanja et al., 2017) 
Tools for malware synthesis 
Synthesis of IoT malware is still in early days, real-time data for 
malware analysis is usually not available, and therefore, the usage 
of emulators/simulators comes into the picture. There are various 
tools in the market to synthesize the IoT malware (i.e., emulators, 
honeypots, testbeds, etc.) but all of these tools have some 
limitations when it comes to the resource-constrained nature of 
IoT. Moreover, no research has been performed yet focusing on 
tools for malware synthesis. 
(Karanja et al., 2017) 
Detection of obfuscated 
malware 
Detection of malware is challenging in IoT due to:  
(i) Author’s ability to write complex obfuscation techniques; (ii) 
Use of polymorphic/metamorphic malware; (iii)higher latency of 
IoT devices being online 24/7;(iv) weak security mechanism to 
(Karanja et al., 2017) 
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discourage malware; (v) and no support of the anti-malware 
system. 
Malware analysis 
Researchers claim that malware are becoming increasingly 
complex and adaptive, malware authors are continuously 
changing their strategies for infection and distribution. Along with 
the complexities of IoT, it is becoming more and more challenging 
to analyse malware targeting IoT environment efficiently. 
Malware analysis is very important to understand different 
perspective of malware that helps in correct identification and 
classification.  
(Dulaunoy et al., 2017, 
Suarez-Tangil et al., 
2014) 
Heavy network traffic analysis 
One of the major problem in IoT is the massive volume of traffic 
generated by billions of devices communicating together. 
Analysis of network traffic plays an important role in 
cybersecurity, it helps in anomaly detection and building up a 
better defense. In case of malicious attacks detection of malicious 
traffic becomes a challenging task. 
(Conti et al., 2018) 
Physical and 
environmental 
security 
Protecting resource constrained 
devices 
IoT environment consists of limited resource devices where 
implementing protective measures is a key challenge. 
(Chiang and Zhang, 
2016) 
Adoption of network layer 
security 
Resource-constrained IoT environment is making the adoption of 
network layer security approaches (such as IPSec and IKE in 
6LoWPAN environments) a challenge in IoT. 
(Granjal et al., 2015) 
51 | P a g e  
 
Synchronization of multiple 
RF tags 
To handle (identify, verify) multiple RF tags centrally to secure 
IoT environment against attacks has been reported as a challenge. 
(Liu et al., 2016) 
Application of physical layer 
security 
IoT has multiple practical constraints due to which the application 
of physical layer security becomes a challenge as reported. 
(Mukherjee, 2015) 
Dynamic activity role 
Cyber entities might be simultaneously idle in some scenarios and 
active in others, this activity has been reported as one of the 
obstacles for the network and application security in IoT. 
(Ning et al., 2013) 
Target tracking 
Target tracking deals with finding/tracking the objects in IoT 
environment, and the capability to track their movements has been 
reported as a security obstacle. 
(Ning et al., 2015) 
Secure localization 
Wireless network sensors are deployed in IoT devices. Secure 
localization in wireless sensor networks is an unattended area that 
can give passage for the malicious attacks.  
(Pirbhulal et al., 2017, 
Chen et al., 2017, Sen, 
2010) 
Implementation of protocols 
and network security 
Heterogenous, resource-constrained devices influence 
significantly on protocols and network security of IoT devices 
during device interaction making the implementation of 
cryptographic protocols for network security a tough challenge. 
(Roman et al., 2013) 
Compromised or malicious 
sensors 
A situation is reported in which a legitimate sensing device gets 
compromised; the adversary usually makes the clones or replicas 
to cause more damage. This kind of compromise is a serious issue 
which requires addressing. 
(Sawand et al., 2015, 
Qiu and Ma, 2016) 
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Mobile node security 
IoT nodes are usually mobile and frequently move from one 
cluster to another.  During this process, there is a possibility of 
potential exploitation, so there is a need to efficiently handle node 
mobility using effective cryptographic mechanisms to provide 
rapid identification, authentication, and privacy protection. 
Because of unavailability of these services mobile node security is 
an issue. 
(Sicari et al., 2015) 
Secure middleware 
Many IoT systems have been derived using middleware 
frameworks that increase the need for the application of security 
matrix to protect middleware from getting compromised. This 
issue has been addressed by researchers, but still, this issue is 
getting reported. 
(Sicari et al., 2015) 
Security of resource-
constrained sensor devices or 
nodes 
The security of resource-constrained IoT sensor nodes is a serious 
security challenge due to resource-constrained sensor nodes. In 
this situation application of traditional security measures is not 
practical because these security measures put enormous 
computation/communication overhead on the devices. 
(Dong and Liu, 2015, 
Mineraud et al., 2016, 
Sen, 2010) 
Secure authentication 
Application of security during the process of authentication, 
while IoT devices are communicating with each other, has been 
reported as an important challenge in various literature. 
(Mineraud et al., 2016, 
Liu et al., 2016, Mendez 
et al., 2017, Borgia, 
2014) 
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Risk treatment 
countermeasures 
and strategies 
Secure location 
A process to implement, detect and maintain the security of node 
locations around the wireless network environment has been 
reported as a challenge. 
(Venckauskas et al., 
2016a) 
Intrusion Detection 
Intrusion detection techniques detect misbehavior or malicious 
IoT devices and notify others in the network to take appropriate 
actions. The nature of IoT environments with limited resource 
makes it challenging to detect the insider and outsider attacks. 
(Ning et al., 2015, 
Alrawais et al., 2017a) 
Cryptographic key 
management issues and their 
solutions 
In a cryptosystem, key management ensures to provide data 
confidentiality in IoT, distributed/diverse nature of IoT raises this 
issue as a security challenge. 
(Tiburski et al., 2015, 
Sen, 2010) 
Firewalling 
Application of right kind of firewalls on IoT is an issue because 
most of the traditional firewalls do not perform efficiently on the 
network traffic generated by IoT environment. 
(Yaqoob et al., 2017) 
Attack detection and 
prevention 
Detection and prevention of malicious attacks (predominantly 
DoS/DDoS) attacks is one of the most serious challenge ever 
reported. 
(Alrawais et al., 2017a, 
Venckauskas et al., 
2016a) 
Safety and 
compliance 
Data Protection 
Data generated by IoT devices is huge, and it is not preserved at 
any level of communication/computation. Due to resource 
constraints, lack of encryption/decryption of data of IoT devices 
is an open challenge where breaches of data protection may occur 
particularly in the cloud and distributed IoT environment. 
(Alrawais et al., 2017a, 
Ziegeldorf et al., 2014) 
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Assessing the status of the 
security of large distributed 
systems in a trustworthy 
manner 
IoT supports large-scale network environments including cloud-
based, large-scale distributed environments and complex 
interconnected networks, i.e. smart cities that includes hospitals, 
transports, logistics and many more. An ability of a system to tell 
in a trustworthy way whether it will operate securely or not is a 
challenge in IoT. 
(Chiang and Zhang, 
2016) 
Security laws and regulations 
The adoption and harmonization of security laws and regulations 
in the presence of contradicting stakeholders, viewpoints, and 
complex devices is a real challenge that requires continuous 
attention.  
(Ciccozzi et al., 2017, 
Suo et al., 2012, Hu, 
2011) 
No defined audit and logging 
standards 
Audit standards make sure that security controls have been 
effectively placed in the environment, while logging standards 
make sure that data being logged is complying with specific 
standards and access standards, this is something not present at the 
moment. The implementation of audit/logging standards without 
any conflict is a complex challenge  
(Kim, 2017, CSA, 2015) 
No security standards for 
platform configurations 
supporting multi-tenancy 
It is a complex challenge to integrate security standards to 
harmonize multi-tenancy platforms. It has been reported that IoT 
systems were designed without consideration of security 
standards. Furthermore, when it comes to the multi-tenancy data 
(Kim, 2017, CSA, 2015) 
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centers, the IoT devices associated with them and their 
configurations make this issue more complicated to resolve.  
Standards required for the 
authentication and 
authorization of the devices are 
lacking 
Implementation of standards for the authorization and 
authentication still lacks in IoT devices/environment. 
(Kim, 2017, CSA, 2015) 
Policy enforcement 
Policy enforcement refers to the mechanisms used to force the 
application of a set of defined actions in a system. When an entity 
or a user is authenticated to access an IoT resource, it becomes 
crucial to enforce the security policy to restrict the user to perform 
only the actions they are allowed to do, which is missing in IoT at 
the moment. 
(Sicari et al., 2015) 
Secure and 
trusted 
communication 
Manipulating routing 
information 
Routing protocols and a mechanism to secure IoT are not well 
defined. Therefore, route manipulation is possible in most of the 
IoT devices. It has been reported in the literature that route 
modification towards a malicious node or to an illegitimate 
destination can lead to information manipulation where the 
security and privacy can be compromised. 
(Du and Chen, 2008) 
Remote attestation (RA) for a 
large number of devices 
Attestation services allow a user or application to authenticate an 
IoT node. In IoT devices, remote attestation is possible at the 
individual device level to prove trustworthiness. It has been 
(Chiang and Zhang, 
2016) 
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reported, RA for a large number of devices require high cost and 
management complexity. Attestation is also challenging in case of 
malware attacks. 
System-level-trust (SLT) 
(Ciccozzi et al., 2017) States SLT as an important challenge in 
IoT, they did not discuss this in detail either the reference they 
quoted explained anything about it. However, in general, SLT is 
an important feature that refers to the trustworthiness of system. 
When considering SLT concerning IoT, it means it should give 
some level of security, reliability, privacy, and trust and keeps the 
IoT device and the environment secure from compromises.    
(Ciccozzi et al., 2017) 
Expanding domains (ED) 
ED is one of the main obstacles to securing the cyber entities in 
IoT; ED has been described as the mapping of objects in IoT with 
networking and communication of cyber entities.  
(Ning et al., 2013) 
Secure transmission of data 
How to securely transmit the collected data from the sensor nodes 
to the destination that remain insecure due to low power and small 
size IoT nodes has been reported as a major challenge. 
(Pirbhulal et al., 2017) 
Mobility capabilities 
In IoT mobility capabilities have been  reported as one of the 
important challenges when users are on the move, it may cause 
one of the following: (i)  service interruption; (ii) service 
continuity; (iii) mobility management of the components 
(Venckauskas et al., 
2016b, Fraga-Lamas et 
al., 2016) 
57 | P a g e  
 
Gateway address exposure 
IoT devices send data to the local gateway on a daily basis 
especially in the healthcare sector. IoT connected devices have 
only been bound to HTTP for the interactions with the gateway. 
HTTP is insufficiently insecure for many of the interactions in the 
IoT while sending the data; attackers may guess gateway address 
and manipulate the data for harmful purposes and cause issues 
related to authorization, authentication, and accounting. 
(Fantacci et al., 2014) 
Restricted interfaces available 
to interact with IoT devices, 
security devices, and the 
applications 
IoT environments face challenges when an organization needs to 
integrate an IoT device into existing infrastructure. Unfortunately, 
there are no interfaces available to do this work. 
(Kim, 2017, CSA, 2015) 
Security 
considerations 
Manage/administer the 
ownership of devices in a 
complex ecosystem 
IoT is a single complex ecosystem where various infrastructures 
are condensed to form a dynamic and interactive environment.  
Where the main challenges are: (i) tracking of multiple devices; 
(ii) identify malicious identities; (iii) bad manufacturer; (iv) 
identify a malicious attacker. In this situation,  
(Furfaro et al., 2017) 
Local and remote software 
update 
IoT devices are vulnerable,  to keep them secure there is a need to 
design software: (i) to update remote software that handles 
security updates; (ii) track firmware updates.  
(Alrawais et al., 2017a) 
58 | P a g e  
 
IoT software, security 
credential and firmware 
updates 
Fixed firmware is an open issue; there are very few appliances that 
keep updating the firmware/software regularly. Many 
vulnerabilities may occur because of outdated software, so the 
best approach is to secure profiles/roles/access, etc. And related 
software up to date. 
(Lin and Bergmann, 
2016, Chiang and 
Zhang, 2016) 
Maintain low-cost 
authentication encryption 
To implement and maintain cost effectiveness of encryption 
mechanism in the authentication process has been reported as a 
challenge. 
(Mazumder et al., 2017) 
Non-Repudiation (NR) 
NR is referred to as the ability to ensure that a person cannot deny 
something. Nonrepudiation becomes an issue in case of malware 
attacks or when the security controls are not properly 
implemented. Although people have tried to address this challenge 
but still the weak areas in IoT environment may trigger this issue 
at any time. 
(Pirbhulal et al., 2017) 
Security 
measures and 
good practices 
Trustworthiness 
Security in IoT is the most important consideration where 
maintaining trust is a key challenge whether it is required in 
cryptographic systems, device firmware or other at any stage of 
IoT environment. 
(Ambrosin et al., 2016, 
Alrawais et al., 2017a, 
Chiang and Zhang, 
2016, Roman et al., 
2013, Pirbhulal et al., 
2017, Sicari et al., 2015, 
Pan et al., 2011) 
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Introducing physical security 
concerns 
Deployed IoT devices often remain exposed to various threats and 
vulnerabilities. Mostly used software-based solutions to protect 
sensitive information. The key challenge is attackers with efficient 
solutions can reverse the software solutions. In this situation, it is 
important to introducing the physical security instead of a software 
solution to protect the IoT asset. With the evolution of IoT, the 
domain of physical security is changing, in particular, with the 
emergence of malware threats, vulnerabilities, and other 
destructive activities. Thus,  IoT is showing considerable potential 
implications in this regard and requiring comprehensive research. 
(Kim, 2017, CSA, 2015) 
Improve authentication 
protocols 
IoT devices confront various security challenges, and 
authentication protocols are required to improve performance, 
security, and effectiveness in IoT environment. 
(Liu et al., 2016) 
Governance in IoT 
Governance guidelines are unclear for IoT, but no one has 
described it in detail. However, it has been reported that there are 
at least two important aspects of governance that need to be 
addressed:  
(i) Information Governance in IoT: IoT creates enormous amount 
of information that requires management by the 
implementation of governance practices. 
(Roman et al., 2013, 
Roman et al., 2011, 
Ning et al., 2015, 
Hoepman, 2011) 
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(ii) Trust governance framework: Governance frameworks 
consist of record management, risk analysis, asset management, 
etc. these are badly missing elements in IoT. There is a serious 
need to implement governance frameworks in IoT that brings 
trustworthiness in this business. 
Maintain the level of security 
To attain/maintain the right level of protection and continuous 
improvement to bring resilience to it has been reported as a 
challenge, although authors of these literature have proposed some 
solution but full security is still an issue. 
(Mazumder et al., 2017) 
QoS 
QoS in IoT is an area which is yet to be explored, the 
heterogeneity, limited resource constraints, mixed network traffic, 
and complex network topologies, etc. make implementation of 
QoS a tough task to do. 
Few other authors have also reported QoS needs at different levels 
within the IoT. 
(Venckauskas et al., 
2016b, Atzori et al., 
2010) 
Risk analysis 
In the IoT environments comprising of numerous smart devices, 
it’s important to effectively evaluate the security,  measure the 
amount of risk involved in order to present a holistic view of the 
whole system. 
(Wen et al., 2017, Riahi 
et al., 2013) 
Patch solutions for IoT 
One of the apparent research gaps in IoT is the inability of the 
devices to upgrade the software (security related) and patch them 
(Yaqoob et al., 2017, 
Min et al., 2014, 
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in a non-disruptive way. It has been reported that IoT devices must 
be able to accept updates and patches of security software. 
Kuusijärvi et al., 2016, 
Sicari et al., 2015) 
Security 
mechanism 
Fault tolerance 
Fault tolerance is the process that enables a system to continue 
operating smoothly/adequately in the event of the failure. This 
feature is lacking and reported as a tight constraint in IoT.  
(Ning et al., 2015, 
Roman et al., 2011, Pan 
et al., 2011) 
Security structures that 
combine control and 
information access 
It has been reported that IoT needs the implementation of security 
structures that combine control and information access but no 
further detail has been specified. 
(Ciccozzi et al., 2017) 
Implementation of 
cryptographic identifier 
Asymmetric keys (based on large numbers) are extensively used 
as cryptographic identifiers, have a significant overhead as 
compare to symmetric keys, therefore, require substantial 
computational resources that is a current challenge in IoT due to 
architectural limitations. 
(Mayer, 2009) 
Architectural security 
weakness 
IoT device manufacturers have been showing little or no focus on 
the implementation of security mechanisms at architectural level 
that gives rise to architectural security concerns and associated 
threats and vulnerabilities. 
(Anantharaman et al., 
2017) 
Limited sense of intrusion 
detection 
The architectural design of IoT doesn’t allow it to be easily 
extended to adopt security mechanisms. Therefore, the ability to 
deal with the intrusion detection to deter malicious attacks is 
insufficient and has been reported as a challenge.  
(Pajouh et al., 2016) 
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Security of 
cryptography/cryptographic 
algorithms 
Application of security measures to protect cryptographic 
algorithms and the keys remains a significant challenge. 
(Xiao et al., 2017, 
Continella et al., 2017) 
System safety 
and reliability 
Location Verification 
A challenge to design secure system for the verification of the 
locations of IoT devices in harsh environments such as transport 
systems. Some authors attribute the presence of location 
verification to better security improvement, but still, this area 
requires considerable work. 
(Alrawais et al., 2017a, 
Chen et al., 2009) 
Mechanisms for self-diagnosis 
and self-repair 
It has been reported that the dependability of IoT can be increased 
when it has the mechanism of self-diagnosis and self-repair in 
order to provide better fault tolerance and smooth operations. It is 
easier to provide this facility at application/device level, but when 
it comes to the whole system, it is considered as one of the hardest 
problems. 
(Garlan et al., 2003) 
Cyber-physical infrastructure 
With the boost of urbanization, smart city concepts is on the rise. 
In which multiple IoT applications are getting deployed. There is 
a major concern of handling physical damage or undesirable risk 
of injury to the infrastructure and their components in case of 
cyber attacks. Moreover, there is need to make whole 
infrastructure (such as electricity supply, water distribution, 
(AlDairi, 2017) 
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streets, buildings, etc.) safe and reliable to provide a better way of 
life. 
Measurement of reliability 
Reliability is one of the important elements to attain the quality of 
service a user expects from the manufacturer of a product. It can 
be interpreted as a measurement of unreliability at which failure 
may occur. Authors have reported this challenge concerning QoS.  
(Venckauskas et al., 
2016b, Venckauskas et 
al., 2016a) 
Threats and 
vulnerabilities 
Destruction or theft of the 
M2M device 
Being deployed in reachable locations, M2M devices or their cards 
can be easily stolen. 
(Barki et al., 2016a) 
Leakage of cryptographic key 
Cryptographic key leakage occurs in public-key systems when the 
system gets attacked by inside or outside attackers. 
(Chiang and Zhang, 
2016) 
Vulnerabilities in IoT devices 
With the rapid advancements in IoT technologies, every day new 
vulnerabilities are getting discovered, some of the vulnerabilities 
are inter-related to existing ones, but the complexity in IoT 
environment allows room for newer ones and makes this challenge 
more difficult to handle. 
(Kim, 2017, CSA, 2015) 
Threats to multitenancy data 
centers 
Multi-tenancy is a system building block in which a single 
instance of an application serves multiple customers. The 
information may be leaked from the main data centers that are 
dealing with different client services that leads to security/privacy 
breaches. 
(Kumarage et al., 2016) 
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Leakage of security-critical 
information 
Problems faced during the transmission of data is the leakage of 
critical information, this may be due to malware as well. 
(Kwon et al., 2016) 
Heavy communication traffic 
IoT devices generate heavy communication traffic that is difficult 
to handle.  
(Li et al., 2014a) 
Physical damage 
In malware attacks, an attacker can destroy physical device or 
important hardware modules of targeted devices. Keeping various 
architectural weaknesses of IoT, it’s a challenging task to keep IoT 
devices safe and secure. 
(Roman et al., 2013, 
Challa et al., 2017) 
Dependability in control 
With the advancement of IoT, the applications like smart cities 
have been thriving where heterogeneous network infrastructure 
exists with multiple sensoring devices, information processing, 
and control systems interact with each other. It has been reported 
that dependability in control is considered as the topmost priority 
challenge in this kind of IoT application where it can be a prime 
target for attackers and terrorists etc. an active attacker can try to 
gain partial or full control over an IoT entity or a system. 
(Roman et al., 2013, 
Challa et al., 2017, 
Zhang et al., 2017) 
Node related issues 
A malicious IoT node could pretend to be legitimate to exchange 
and collect the data generated by other IoT devices for malicious 
purposes. With ever-increasing volume of nodes can cause (i) 
node capture issues; (ii) detection of captured, rogue or unreliable 
nodes is a serious challenge. 
(Roman et al., 2013, 
Challa et al., 2017, 
Alrawais et al., 2017a, 
Ning et al., 2015) 
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Individual or group privacy 
information thefts 
Privacy related thefts are a nightmare for any user. It was always 
a big challenge and will still be a serious issue whether a privacy 
theft occurs at an individual or group level resulting in disclosure 
of sensitive information. 
(Ning et al., 2013) 
Visible gaps in 
IoT 
Limited incident response 
paradigms 
Authors have reported that there are limited best practices 
available for incident response and existing incident response 
mechanisms will not be adequate for emerging IoT infrastructures. 
(Chiang and Zhang, 
2016, CSA, 2015) 
Limited guidance present for 
lifecycle 
maintenance/management of 
IoT devices 
IoT usually has limited capability operating systems in which 
guidance on secure configuration of these devices is either limited 
or not present. 
(CSA, 2015) 
Limitations of cryptographic 
algorithms 
The applicability of cryptographic algorithms in IoT is limited and 
requires further analysis to ensure that algorithms can be 
successfully implemented given the constrained memory and 
processor speed expected in the IoT. 
(Trappe et al., 2015) 
Self-storage 
Self-storage is an open issue in IoT that is linked with limited 
resource-constrained environment. The problem occurs when 
alternative storage is needed, in which handling of data ownership 
and access control management is difficult. 
(Mineraud et al., 2016) 
No data cataloging 
The need of addressing modern data processing is readily 
becoming essential that is only possible if data catalogs are 
(Mineraud et al., 2016) 
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available, unfortunately, this feature is unavailable in IoT and the 
author mentions resource limitations as the reason for this 
unavailability. 
Gap analysis 
ENISA performed gap analysis and identified following research 
areas requiring attention: 
• Fragmentation in existing security approaches and regulations. 
• Lack of awareness and knowledge. 
• Insecure design and/or development. 
• Lack of interoperability across different IoT devices, 
platforms, and Frameworks. 
• Lack of economic incentives. 
• Lack of proper product lifecycle management. 
(ENISA, 2017) 
Vulnerable to 
attacks 
Attack detection and 
prevention 
Nowadays manufacturers have been rapidly introducing new 
products in the market, throwing more and more devices in which 
security and privacy are already questionable, the need to detect 
and prevent cyber security attacks particularly malicious attacks is 
increasing every day. All sorts of vulnerabilities targeting physical 
interfaces, hardware profiles, wired/wireless communication 
protocols, user interfaces, ports, etc. are posing the most 
significant challenge for IoT in which there is a need to develop 
approaches to detect and prevent the maximum number of threats. 
(Chen et al., 2009, 
Alrawais et al., 2017b, 
Venckauskas et al., 
2016a, Venckauskas et 
al., 2016b, Kliarsky, 
2017) 
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Malware issues 
The reported cases of malware targetting IoT rising significantly. 
Authors of various literature have reported numerous reasons for 
malware attacks (i.e., architectural limitations or design 
implications, deficiencies in security mechanisms, 
Internal/external threats, software vulnerabilities, software 
modification and many more). The varied possibilities of malware 
related issue in IoT making this one of the most significant 
challenges. 
(Yu et al., 2017, Chiang 
and Zhang, 2016, Ning 
et al., 2013, Kumarage 
et al., 2016, Alrawais et 
al., 2017a, Liu and Sun, 
2016, Sawand et al., 
2015, Barki et al., 
2016b) 
Attacks on IoT devices/ or 
environments 
Various attacks discussed in literature have been summarised in 
table 3 
Table 3 
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2.5.2. Authentication:  
Every day a large number of IoT devices are getting manufactured based on diverse protocols 
where the heterogeneity and ad-hoc nature of agents create complex configurations. IoT 
technology aims to provide accessibility (anytime, anything and anywhere), better services and 
seamless communication to connected smart devices, where authentication is prerequisite. The 
big challenge lies in the design and development of IoT infrastructure where security and 
privacy were not considered. Rigorous authentication is based on efficient, user-friendly and 
scalable procedures/protocols requires resources such as storage and computation which are 
lacking in IoT due to poor architecture. In this scenario, identifiable device/user information 
have maximum disclosure giving criminals access to resources and raising further complex 
issues of anonymity and untraceability. This deficiency of authentication procedures also cause 
more complex security and privacy issues (Alrawais et al., 2017a, Amadeo et al., 2016, Zhang 
et al., 2013, Al-Fuqaha et al., 2015, Tiburski et al., 2015, Venckauskas et al., 2016b, Pirbhulal 
et al., 2017, Sicari et al., 2015). 
2.5.3. Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA):  
The design and build of IoT devices have a limited sense of hiding the information from 
unauthorized people to view it. Data sensed and exchanged by things, and the privacy of 
humans/things must be ensured to prevent unauthorized identification and tracking (Liu and 
Sun, 2016, Tiburski et al., 2015, Lin and Bergmann, 2016, Pirbhulal et al., 2017, Sicari et al., 
2015). Confidentiality (privacy), integrity and availability are the true aspects of security. CIA 
is a model, guide and a complementary requirement for information security, if ignored or not 
followed correctly may raise very complex security and privacy issues. Unfortunately, CIA 
model was not given much attention in IoT. This model should be enforced at every level of 
IoT infrastructure, i.e. access control, data sensed or exchanged, and authentication, etc. 
2.5.4. Crisis management:  
Due to immense popularity, IoT environments/devices have been a target of malicious attacks 
(in particular botnets and ransomware) resulting in a denial of service. Moreover, it’s a part of 
an effective governance plan to devise strategies to respond to the crisis situations that may 
cause intolerable business disruption to resume to the state of smooth operations (Chiang and 
Zhang, 2016). Effective brute-force solutions cannot be applied in crisis situations. Therefore, 
there is need to address the associated challenges comprehensively. 
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2.5.5. Cryptography:  
IoT devices usually come with 8 or 16-bit chips, the constraint of limited energy (small 
batteries), storage and onboard memory that prevents the implementation of efficient, flexible 
and inexpensive cryptographic algorithms (Ning et al., 2015, Roman et al., 2013, Venckauskas 
et al., 2016b). There is a need to design efficient cryptographic algorithms which can be applied 
throughout the device to offer an end-to-end secure communication channel. In this regard, 
lightweight security protocols are the best choice for 8-bit or 16-bit devices. The 
implementation of these security protocols is widely influenced by the heterogeneity and 
scalability issues of IoT. Along with this, a competent algorithm requires storage and energy 
in the devices which is a very challenging task in IoT (Riahi Sfar et al., 2017). Moreover, the 
revocation of old/useless keys (public/private) is another issue in IoT, and various authors have 
proposed their approaches to address this issue, but this challenge is still a nightmare because 
of several other inter-related problems.  
2.5.6. Data privacy and protection:  
A tremendous amount of data is generated by IoT devices every day. The unrestricted access 
to that information poses a significant security and privacy risks to the consumers due to the 
fact that devices not only connected with cloud but also forming local intranets to exchange 
data between them (Barki et al., 2016b, Mayer, 2009, Sicari et al., 2015, Wang et al., 2014, Liu 
and Sun, 2016, Ning et al., 2015, Pirbhulal et al., 2017). The key data privacy-challenges are:  
• Most IoT devices fail to encrypt data that are being transferred.  
• User sensitive information can be compromised due to unencrypted data.  
2.5.7. Data processing and computation 
One of the most important aspects of IoT is “data,” which poses very complex challenges due 
to the presence of 3Vs, i.e. “Volume,” “Velocity” and “Variety.”  The process of analyzing or 
computing the huge amount of data (volume) being generated at a rapid pace (velocity) from 
various sources (variety) that sometimes includes outsourced data is a serious problem. Issues 
related to data processing and computation include aggregation, retention, integrity, freshness, 
handling of false or noisy data, secure fusion, computational cost, verification of outsourced 
data, verification of de-duplication data in mobile and cloud-based IoT. Various researchers 
are using different techniques for the processing and computation, but still it’s an open research 
challenge in IoT (Alrawais et al., 2017a, Kumarage et al., 2016, Kwon et al., 2016, Pirbhulal 
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et al., 2017, Sawand et al., 2015, Tiburski et al., 2015, Venckauskas et al., 2016b, Xiao et al., 
2017, Yasin et al., 2017, Yu et al., 2017, Zhang et al., 2017). 
2.5.8. Digital forensics:  
Digital forensics is an important discipline that helps to identify illicit activities from the digital 
world for a variety of matters, e.g. criminal cases and cyber malware attacks (inside/outside), 
etc. There are six important pillars of the forensic investigation, but when it comes to the 
application of these six elements in IoT, forensic examiners face numerous issues. Many of 
these issues have been reported in the literature, but the solution to these issues still requires 
work. For example, a traditional forensic tool like ENCASE works well with conventional 
technologies like laptops, desktop computers or mobile devices but when it comes to IoT 
devices (home appliances, i.e. smart fridge), we have no answer. IoT is a fast-moving 
technology concerning the ever increasing number of devices and massive volume of data. It 
means IoT digital forensics needs to constantly develop IoT-specific forensic tools by 
addressing the challenges reported in the literature also summarised in the table (Attwood et 
al., 2011, Brown et al., 2005, Caviglione et al., 2017, Conlan et al., 2016, D’Orazio et al., 2017, 
Harbawi and Varol, 2017, Liu, 2015, Oriwoh and Sant, 2013, Quick and Choo, 2014, Sheldon, 
2005, Taylor et al., 2010, Vlachopoulos et al., 2013, Yakubu et al., 2016, Zawoad and Hasan, 
2015, Zulkipli et al., 2017).  
2.5.9. Heavy network traffic:  
Despite all the benefits of IoT, the weaknesses of one-time, low cost, resource-constrained 
and unsecured sensors generating a massive amount of network traffic gives birth to 
another challenge of how to analyze network traffic particularly if that traffic is malicious 
to understand the pattern of clean and malicious behaviors. There is not one possible answer 
to this situation because the volume of the data requires more hardware/software resources 
and highly analytical techniques and continuous improvement in them to cope with the 
ever-increasing amount of information and cope with newer threats (Gan et al., 2011). 
2.5.10. Heterogeneous interactions:  
IoT technology inherent the complexity due to a considerable number of heterogeneous devices 
associated with interoperability system to exchange the information with each other. 
Constrained entities share internet with non-constrained devices, either directly or through the 
gateways. In this situation, security and privacy of IoT devices are compromised due to their 
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lack of support of heterogeneity and incompetent architectural model (Gubbi et al., 2013, Kim, 
2017).   
2.5.11. Identity and access management (IAM) 
In our daily lives, we remain occupied in billions of IoT devices, and there is a continuous 
growth in numbers which is a challenging task regarding identity and access management. IAM 
refers to the process of representing/recognizing entities as digital identities in virtual networks. 
It enables (right) people to access only concerned objects only when needed. The functions of 
IAM are increasing rapidly where it is important to identify not only the authorized people, 
tracking of their object, and handling of their privileges towards a variety of different data 
sources. From the perspective of cyber security identity management of IoT devices is the most 
critical and vital area towards securing the environment (i.e., identify people, devices, 
monitors, sensors and secure data access, etc.). Without IAM an attacker may fabricate and 
create a fake identity, RFID identity can be duplicated or spoofed, and finally, the existence of 
multiple identities is an issue as well (Mayer, 2009, Roman et al., 2013). Furthermore, an object 
may have either multiple or fake owners as well which may cause some serious issues unless 
we have a right defense in place (Babar et al., 2010, Lam and Chi, 2016, Li et al., 2011, Mahalle 
et al., 2010, Meghanathan, 2010). There is a need to identify between fake/fabricated or 
duplicated identities vs. original identities which is a very challenging task. 
2.5.12. Inadequate infrastructure or bad design:  
IoT is a hot favorite topic for the researchers because of its bright future perspective, being a 
consumer’s first choice, and extraordinary long list of security issues that cause massive service 
outage worldwide. IoT devices were designed to improve lives of the people, but because of 
lack of incentives for the vendors, security features were entirely ignored from 
hardware/software infrastructure making IoT device or environmental design a “Bad design.” 
It has been noticed that in the event of any DoS attack, the attackers utilize weaknesses of the 
target system in which IoT is full. At first place, if the prototype of IoT device was not made 
considering security as a part of its build, it may be considered unfit to be placed in the list of 
safe devices. Moreover, if the same prototype with weak or no security features is adopted, 
then it may be regarded as “inadequate infrastructure” or “bad design.” With this critical 
infrastructure, IoT is facing many challenges described in the table (Alrawais et al., 2017a, 
Dong and Liu, 2015, Venckauskas et al., 2016a, Yaqoob et al., 2017). 
2.5.13. Inadequate or limited support:  
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Provision of support is one of a most important factor related to customer satisfaction. With 
the rapid increase in a number of devices with heterogeneous/complex configuration, support 
process has become more challenging. IoT industry will require a change in support process; 
this includes staff competencies to reflect strong IT/cyber security skills (i.e., knowledge about 
IoT devices and environment), management guidelines, cyber security skills, maturity in 
technical/business processes, and authentication processes within an organization. (Kim, 2017, 
Lin and Bergmann, 2016, Yaqoob et al., 2017) 
2.5.14. Physical and environmental security 
The fundamental issue in IoT is not only to protect its intrinsic elements (i.e., object or entities), 
but also to protect the information assets from malicious threats. Physical and environmental 
security is not a new concept, but its implementation in IoT is a challenging task that focuses 
on detection/prevention of unauthorized entities from gaining access to a resource and steal 
valuable assets. However, diverse nature of IoT devices, immature build and frequent changes 
in infrastructural design creates obstacles in this regard (Sen, 2010, Mendez et al., 2017, 
Borgia, 2014, Chen et al., 2017, Luong et al., 2016, Trappe et al., 2015, Liu et al., 2016).  
2.5.15. Risk treatment, countermeasures, and strategies (RTCS):  
Various authors have reported challenges i.e. the development of intrusion detection 
mechanism, firewalls, attack detection/prevention system and devising strategies for the secure 
management of cryptographic keys in order to save them from unauthorised access (Alrawais 
et al., 2017a, Ning et al., 2015, Tiburski et al., 2015, Trappe et al., 2015, Venckauskas et al., 
2016b, Yaqoob et al., 2017). We grouped these challenges under RTCS. Risk management is 
considered as a most critical part of the organizational governance; if ignored, it’s not possible 
for the organizations to survive for long. Therefore, it would not be wrong to consider it as a 
crucial challenge for an IoT environment to have risk treatment, countermeasures and their 
strategies as a part of their ongoing process. It is not a one-time process but rather an ongoing 
process, important phases in risk management include: (i) “Plan” (identification and evaluation 
of risks); (ii) “Do” (risk treatment, make strategies to overcome future risks); (iii) “Check” 
(analyse changes) and (iv) “Act” (plan for future events).  All of these phases are recursive and 
help the analysts to discover all associated risks and develop strategies to act accordingly to 
effectively treat them. When we talked about IoT environment RTCS should come in top 
priority list (which at the moment it is not).  
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2.5.16. Safety and compliance (SAC):  
Safety and compliance are considered as important driving forces of IoT since IoT devices 
have been a favorite target of cybercriminals who may steal or destroy important confidential 
information. This is why the need for safety and compliance becomes crucial and likely to grow 
in importance in IoT. By nature, IoT brings various security risks directly to the organizations, 
every organization must follow specific compliance standards to avoid substantial payouts in 
terms of fines and loss of reputation.  
Unfortunately, this is the area in IoT where organizations did not pay much attention which 
may cause potential implications. IoT industry needs practices for recognizing the safety 
requirements while designing the products, delivering them to the broader markets and 
customers. IoT devices without safety, compliance, and conformity may rise safety-related 
compliance issues (Alrawais et al., 2017a, Chiang and Zhang, 2016, Ciccozzi et al., 2017, CSA, 
2015, Gubbi et al., 2013, Hu, 2011, Kim, 2017, Sicari et al., 2015, Suo et al., 2012, Trappe et 
al., 2015, Ziegeldorf et al., 2014).   
2.5.17. Secure and trusted communication (SATC) 
SATC helps to improve availability/accessibility of IoT resources. Network communication is 
an integral part of IoT, where security and privacy are the indispensable but neglected tools. 
IoT relies on various communication channels such as sensing nodes, routing systems, etc. 
When a user or a sensor node share or exchange their data through a communication channel, 
in this process authentication and authorization play an important role, if communication 
channel(s) is insecure attacks like a man in the middle are possible. It’s a challenging task to 
discover, verify, identify, and authenticate the devices/data in an IoT network to preserve 
privacy and whole CIA-triad. There is a need to establish a framework or set of rules to bring 
trust and security in entire communication process instead of at a particular level.  
2.5.18. Security considerations 
It is a known fact that in this scientific age people are increasingly relying on IoT devices 
facilitating them in every walk of life. Literally, we have billions of interconnected devices, 
and this figure is likely to be increased in the near future.  As stated previously these devices 
are a favorite target of malware, intrusions of various kinds and interfaces to steal/expose 
personal information and jeopardize the safety of the people. Therefore, it’s a major concern 
of security to address: (i) how to manage/administer the ownership of these devices in a 
complex ecosystem; (ii) how to update local/remote security credentials and other related 
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software or firmware; (iii) how to maintain low-cost features for implementing encryption for 
authentication roles;(iv) and finally how to provide non-repudiation while considering the 
limitations of them like heterogeneity, complexity, scalability and volume etc. 
2.5.19. Security measures and good practices (SMAGP) 
It is a known problem with IoT that most of the vendors have been developing their products 
without sufficient inclusion of security-related features in them. The lack of important features 
results in serious issues for not only the organizations but also for the public intending to use 
them. To provide consumers security & privacy concerning their data, and trustworthiness in 
the communication, government policy agencies should enforce vendors to implement proper 
security measures and good practices as a part of their hardware and software design. At this 
stage of IoT progress, due to various complex factors, it is not possible to govern a set of rules 
that are applicable universally on all sorts of devices, but it is possible to define a list of top 
most important security measures and a list of good practices to benefit the whole environment. 
In this regard, it is important to identify the gaps and then merge the technical solutions for 
security measures and good practices. 
2.5.20. Security mechanisms:  
Security of IoT has become a ubiquitous issue in which all traditional concepts have become 
upside down. One of the fundamental elements of securing IoT device is to implement strong 
security mechanisms. However, the architectural model of IoT devices doesn’t allow to be 
easily extended to adopt security mechanisms. Therefore, the ability to deal with the intrusion 
detection is limited. Various challenges in this regard have been reported in the literature, we 
have listed few of the challenges in the table. The presented challenges indicate that there is a 
need for robust IoT security mechanisms to acquire a secure IoT infrastructure that penetrates 
well in all IoT applications.  
2.5.21. System safety and reliability (SSaR) 
It is known the fact that there is no dependability in IoT, dependability comes from the 
pursuance of two components, i.e. safety and reliability which are prerequisite of a better 
quality of service (Zin et al., 2016). These two components form the basis of failure-free 
communication environment.  
With the urbanization, a smart city is the revolutionary concept where different IoT 
technologies are being deployed (such as IoT objects, cloud computing, real-world user 
interfaces, semantic web, etc.) and forming a smart system. These systems remain incomplete 
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without considering the safety and reliability. The “safety” and “reliability” should be assessed 
and measured at various levels (i.e., sensor level and communication level etc.) to provide a 
secure system (Li et al., 2014b, Li et al., 2015, Zheng et al., 2014, Kharchenko et al., 2016).  
2.5.22. Threats and vulnerabilities 
There is no doubt about it that IoT technologies contain serious vulnerabilities that are 
undeniable. Along with this, the rapid expansion of devices inherits same or sometimes even 
more complex vulnerabilities exponentially expanding the possibility of various threats. It 
would be highly dangerous for an IoT infrastructure if we ignore or misjudge the importance 
of vulnerability management and threat detection solution. Therefore, we need to put it into our 
priority list to identify the existing threats and vulnerabilities before they compromise 
security/privacy/trustworthiness of a system. 
2.5.23. Visible gaps in IoT:  
A solid understanding of a domain is only possible when we perform technology gap analysis. 
Purpose of this group is to provide a summary of few of the most prominent gaps in IoT that 
are co-related with security/privacy/trust challenges. Another reason to include this group is to 
highlight important aspects of modern technology that are clearly lacking in IoT, and their 
solution may bring resilience to IoT by making the technology mature. 
2.5.24. Vulnerable to attacks:  
Protecting the IoT devices or infrastructures from threats is a complex and challenging task. 
Security experts believe that global connectivity (access anywhere), accessibility (access 
anyhow, anytime) are the fundamental tenets for numerous types of attacks. However, there 
is no uniformity in the attacks and hard to expect where and when the attack may target. 
Attackers may focus on various communication channels, sensors, hardware profiles, 
information exchanged, etc. causing either fabrication, denial of service, jamming, identity 
theft, etc. In addition to this, the co-inherent complexity of IoT networks, highly scalable 
nature, heterogeneity of the entities located at various locations attract more attacks to give 
an attacker enough room to break in the system.  
2.5.25. Attack detection and prevention:  
Nowadays manufacturers have been rapidly introducing new products in the market, throwing 
more and more devices in which security and privacy are already questionable, the need to 
detect and prevent cyber security attacks particularly malicious attacks is increasing every day. 
All sorts of vulnerabilities targeting physical interfaces, hardware profiles, wired/wireless 
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communication protocols, user interfaces, ports, etc. are posing a significant challenge in 
which there is a need to develop approaches to detect and prevent a maximum number of 
threats (Alrawais et al., 2017a, Venckauskas et al., 2016a, Kliarsky, 2017). 
2.6–  Malware attacks as a big security/privacy risk and related work 
The benefits of IoT are undoubtedly most attractive. Therefore, this technology has been 
adopted by various big organizations.  On the other hand, security and privacy challenges of 
IoT is creating a global impression that “Internet of Things is the new Windows XP-malware’s 
favorite target!” (Kuusijärvi et al., 2016). This statement is quite convincing when you see the 
published literature about IoT attacks. The table 3 shows 45 different IoT attacks reported in 
the literature; these attacks are directly or indirectly related to malware.  
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Table 3: The summary of IoT attacks reported in literature related directly or indirectly with 
malware 
Attack Description Reference Target References 
Availability 
attacks 
Availability attacks mainly 
utilize the limitations of 
bandwidth and transmission 
power resulting in 
communication failure in 
IoT setup. 
(Sun et al., 
2017b) 
Network 
Layer 
Transport 
Layer 
Our 
contribution 
Camouflage 
attacks 
A camouflage node hides 
itself under a false identity 
and utilizes this appearance 
from a legitimately 
authenticated node, and 
spreads fake and harmful 
messages, or executes 
blackhole attacks, or other 
fatal attacks 
(Sun et al., 
2017b) 
Network 
layer 
(El 
Mouaatamid 
et al., 2016) 
Chosen 
ciphertext 
attack 
A CCA is an attack model 
for cryptanalysis in which 
the cryptanalyst gathers 
information, at least in part, 
by selecting a ciphertext and 
obtaining its decryption 
under an unknown key. 
(Li et al., 
2014a) 
Transport 
Layer 
Our 
contribution 
Clone attack 
In these kinds of attacks, the 
attacker captures and 
compromises legitimate 
node usually makes the 
clones. 
(Du and 
Chen, 
2008, 
Gope and 
Hwang, 
2015) 
Application 
Layer 
Network 
Layer 
Transport 
Layer 
(El 
Mouaatamid 
et al., 2016) 
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Collision 
attacks 
An attack on 
a cryptographic hash which 
tries to find two inputs 
producing the same hash 
value. 
(Du and 
Chen, 
2008) 
Data Link 
layer, 
Network 
Layer 
(El 
Mouaatamid 
et al., 2016, 
Borgohain et 
al., 2015, 
Ghildiyal et 
al., 2014, 
Karlof and 
Wagner, 
2003) 
Cryptographic 
overhead and 
WSN attacks 
Security in IOT and WSN 
requires further research,  
although security elements 
exit in many protocols but 
the still specific type of 
security analysis is needed 
which causes crypto 
overhead and related cyber 
attacks. 
(Fantacci 
et al., 
2014) 
Network 
Layer 
Transport 
Layer 
Our 
contribution 
Data Attacks 
(Modification 
and Injection) 
Data can be compromised 
during its transmission as 
well as at rest on a device or 
an application’s server. 
(Barki et 
al., 2016b) 
Application 
Layer 
(El 
Mouaatamid 
et al., 2016) 
Delay attack 
In these kinds of attacks, an 
attacker intentionally puts a 
delay in sending or receive 
messages for some time to 
fail the time synchronization 
process. 
(Du and 
Chen, 
2008) 
Physical 
Layer /Data 
Link Layer 
MINE 
DoS and DDoS 
A denial of service attack 
occurs when one or multiple 
systems gets flooded with 
bandwidth or services 
(Barki et 
al., 2016b, 
Challa et 
al., 2017, 
Physical 
Layer 
Data link 
Layer 
(El 
Mouaatamid 
et al., 2016, 
Ghildiyal et 
79 | P a g e  
 
intentionally or 
unintentionally by an 
attacker. 
Ning et al., 
2013, 
Luong et 
al., 2016, 
Qiu and 
Ma, 2016, 
Roman et 
al., 2013, 
Du and 
Chen, 
2008, Liu 
and Sun, 
2016, Sun 
et al., 
2017b, 
Giuliano et 
al., 2017) 
Network 
Layer 
Transport 
Layer 
al., 2014, 
Jing et al., 
2014) 
Eavesdropping 
Eavesdropping is an 
unethical process of 
listening to the private 
conversation between 
people without their consent 
(Challa et 
al., 2017, 
Ning et al., 
2013, 
Roman et 
al., 2013, 
Wang et 
al., 2014, 
Sun et al., 
2017b, 
Barki et 
al., 2016b) 
Network 
Layer 
Transport 
Layer 
(El 
Mouaatamid 
et al., 2016, 
Jing et al., 
2014) 
Exhaustion 
The exhaustion attacks are 
computer security threats 
capable of crashing, 
hanging, or other sorts of 
(Du and 
Chen, 
2008) 
Data Link 
layer 
(El 
Mouaatamid 
et al., 2016, 
Borgohain et 
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interferences with the 
victim. 
al., 2015, 
Ghildiyal et 
al., 2014) 
Fake sensing 
attacks 
Crowdsensing networks are 
vulnerable to faked sensing 
attacks by users causes 
sensing costs and privacy 
leakage 
(Luong et 
al., 2016) 
  
Firmware 
attack 
Flaws in a firmware of IoT 
devices leading an attacker 
to modify the firmware and 
replace it with his malicious 
one to achieve his goals. 
(Liu and 
Sun, 2016) 
Data link 
Physical 
layer 
 
Flooding (incl. 
ICMP & Hello 
flooding) 
To bring down the entire 
network or the services by 
flooding it with enormous 
amounts of traffic. 
(Du and 
Chen, 
2008) 
Network 
Layer 
Transport 
Layer 
(El 
Mouaatamid 
et al., 2016, 
Borgohain et 
al., 2015, 
Ghildiyal et 
al., 2014, 
Karlof and 
Wagner, 
2003) 
GPS deception 
In this kind of attack, an 
adversary can provide a 
node with fake information 
about its location. 
(Sun et al., 
2017b) 
  
Hardware-
Based Attacks 
Various hardware-based 
attacks have emerged for 
example stealth backdoor 
circuits or trojans to steal 
precious patient 
information. 
(Yasin et 
al., 2017) 
Physical 
layer 
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Illusion attacks 
In this kind of attacks, some 
voluntary sensors that 
generate false or 
meaningless information in 
the network will be placed. 
These malicious sensors are 
always properly 
authenticated and identified 
in some way or other. 
(Sun et al., 
2017b) 
  
Impersonation 
attacks 
An attack in which an 
attacker successfully 
assumes the identity of one 
of the legitimate parties in a 
system or in a 
communications protocol. 
(Wang et 
al., 2014, 
Barki et 
al., 2016b, 
Gope and 
Hwang, 
2015, 
Challa et 
al., 2017) 
Network 
Layer 
Transport 
Layer 
(El 
Mouaatamid 
et al., 2016) 
Insider attacks 
Malicious attacks executed 
(intentionally or 
unintentionally) on a 
network or computer system 
by a person with authorized 
system access. This attack 
has also been named as 
“privileged insider attack.” 
(Kumarage 
et al., 
2016, 
Challa et 
al., 2017) 
Physical 
layer, 
Application 
layer 
Link Layer 
(Karlof and 
Wagner, 
2003) 
Internal attacks, 
vulnerabilities 
caused, 
software 
vulnerabilities 
and software 
A negative use of 
programming to harm 
people or network 
environments. 
(Yu et al., 
2017, 
Chiang and 
Zhang, 
2016, Ning 
et al., 
2013, 
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modification, 
etc. 
Kumarage 
et al., 
2016, 
Alrawais et 
al., 2017a, 
Liu and 
Sun, 2016, 
Sawand et 
al., 2015, 
Barki et 
al., 2016b) 
Jamming 
Jamming attacks prevent 
nodes from using the 
channel to communicate by 
occupying the channel that 
they are communicating. 
(Du and 
Chen, 
2008, Ning 
et al., 
2013) 
Physical 
Layer 
Data link 
layer 
(El 
Mouaatamid 
et al., 2016, 
Borgohain et 
al., 2015, 
Ghildiyal et 
al., 2014, 
Karlof and 
Wagner, 
2003) 
Logical Attacks 
Targeting the proper 
functioning of a system 
without making any changes 
to the device’s software 
(Barki et 
al., 2016b) 
  
Man-in-the-
Middle attacks 
In MIMA, the attacker 
secretly relays and possibly 
alters the communication 
between two parties who 
believe they are directly 
communicating with each 
other. 
(Liu and 
Sun, 2016, 
Challa et 
al., 2017, 
Giuliano et 
al., 2017, 
Qiu and 
Ma, 2016) 
Network 
Layer 
Transport 
Layer 
(Jing et al., 
2014) 
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Masquerading 
Pretending to be something 
or someone it's not. 
(Giuliano 
et al., 
2017, Sun 
et al., 
2017b, Du 
and Chen, 
2008) 
Application 
Layer 
 
Message 
manipulation 
attack (MMA) 
A MMA is an attack to 
manipulate a 
communication message 
sent by the devices. 
(Du and 
Chen, 
2008) 
Application 
Layer 
(Borgohain 
et al., 2015) 
Mole attacks 
Motion sensors in a 
smartwatch could leak 
personal information when a 
user types on a laptop 
keyboard, which is referred 
to as a mole attack 
(Liu and 
Sun, 2016) 
  
Mule attacks 
Adversaries may manipulate 
the local environment to fool 
sensors to record activities 
to achieve credits 
(Liu and 
Sun, 2016) 
  
Network traffic 
analysis 
Analysis of network traffic 
behavior/patterns by a 
passive attacker to steal 
information. 
(Giuliano 
et al., 
2017, Ning 
et al., 
2013) 
Network 
Layer 
 
Offline 
password 
guessing attack 
An offline attack attempts to 
emulate the password and 
requires a known output of 
that process. 
(Challa et 
al., 2017) 
  
Physical attacks 
targeting 
physical layer 
Any malicious attack 
focusing on the physical 
layer 
(Barki et 
al., 2016b) 
Physical 
layer 
(Borgohain 
et al., 2015) 
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Physical-level 
malicious 
attacks 
Attacks targeting physical 
layer for example data 
slurping in which an attacker 
can steal data using even an 
iPod. 
(Ciccozzi 
et al., 
2017) 
Physical 
layer 
(Borgohain 
et al., 2015) 
Relay attacks 
An adversary may conduct a 
relay attack 
to make an entity believe 
that it is in the vicinity of the 
sender or receiver 
(Barki et 
al., 2016b) 
Physical 
Layer 
Data link 
Layer 
(El 
Mouaatamid 
et al., 2016) 
The release of 
Message 
Content attack 
A passive attack in which a 
mail message, phone call or 
important messages would 
be intercepted or listened to 
is called the RoMCA. 
(Giuliano 
et al., 
2017) 
  
Replay attacks 
Replay attacks have a 
unique feature, i.e., it can be 
conducted 
by illegitimate nodes. A lot 
of message replays increase 
the cost of precious 
bandwidth, resulting in the 
dropping of priority 
messages from the queue. 
(Ning et 
al., 2013, 
Du and 
Chen, 
2008, 
Wang et 
al., 2016c, 
Sun et al., 
2017b, 
Giuliano et 
al., 2017, 
Gope and 
Hwang, 
2015, 
Challa et 
al., 2017) 
MultiLayer 
Attacks 
Transport 
layer 
(El 
Mouaatamid 
et al., 2016, 
Borgohain et 
al., 2015, 
Jing et al., 
2014, Karlof 
and Wagner, 
2003) 
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Route attacks 
including 
Denial of 
services 
Malicious nodes in the 
network modify the routing 
information or change the 
number of hops in 
forwarding routing request 
packets causing a denial of 
service 
(Sun et al., 
2017b) 
Network 
Layer 
Transport 
Layer 
(El 
Mouaatamid 
et al., 2016) 
Secrecy attack 
The secrecy attacks steal 
data by eavesdropping or 
interception. 
(Sun et al., 
2017b) 
Network 
Layer 
Transport 
Layer 
 
Selective 
forwarding 
attack 
Where compromised node 
drops packets selectively 
(Du and 
Chen, 
2008) 
Application 
Layer, 
Network 
Layer, 
Routing 
layer 
(El 
Mouaatamid 
et al., 2016, 
Pongle and 
Chavan, 
2015, 
Borgohain et 
al., 2015, 
Ghildiyal et 
al., 2014, 
Karlof and 
Wagner, 
2003) 
Side channel 
attack 
These attacks could be based 
on either power 
consumption, timing 
information, fault or 
electromagnetic leaks and 
enable the retrieval of the 
“used” secret keys. 
(Barki et 
al., 2016b) 
MultiLayer 
Attacks 
(El 
Mouaatamid 
et al., 2016) 
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Sinkhole (black 
hole) attack 
where compromised node 
tries to attract network 
traffic by advertising its fake 
routing update and attract 
more attacks 
(Du and 
Chen, 
2008) 
Network 
Layer 
Transport 
Layer 
Application 
Layer 
(El 
Mouaatamid 
et al., 2016, 
Pongle and 
Chavan, 
2015, 
Borgohain et 
al., 2015, 
Ghildiyal et 
al., 2014, 
Jing et al., 
2014) 
Skimming 
attack 
The wireless interception of 
information extracted from 
RFID chip-based debit, 
credit and ID cards and other 
documents, such as 
passports. 
(Ning et 
al., 2013) 
Network 
Layer 
Transport 
Layer 
 
Spoofing attack 
Emulate/Imitate/Reproduce 
something while 
exaggerating its 
characteristic features for 
comic effect. 
(Barki et 
al., 2016b, 
Ning et al., 
2013) 
Network 
Layer 
Transport 
Layer 
(El 
Mouaatamid 
et al., 2016, 
Borgohain et 
al., 2015, 
Ghildiyal et 
al., 2014, 
Karlof and 
Wagner, 
2003) 
Stolen smart 
card attack 
An attack to steal 
information about smart 
card 
(Challa et 
al., 2017) 
  
Surface attacks 
Attacks on a physical 
surface layer of an IoT 
(Minoli et 
al., 2017) 
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device to steal private 
information. 
Sybil attack 
A Sybil attack is an attack 
that the adversary forges one 
or multiple identities. 
(Du and 
Chen, 
2008, Sun 
et al., 
2017b, Qiu 
and Ma, 
2016, 
Dong and 
Liu, 2015) 
Physical 
Layer 
Data link 
Layer 
Network 
Layer 
(El 
Mouaatamid 
et al., 2016, 
Pongle and 
Chavan, 
2015, 
Borgohain et 
al., 2015, 
Ghildiyal et 
al., 2014, 
Karlof and 
Wagner, 
2003) 
Tampering 
Interfere with a system or 
process to cause damage or 
make unauthorized 
alterations. 
(Ning et 
al., 2013, 
Du and 
Chen, 
2008) 
Physical 
layer 
(El 
Mouaatamid 
et al., 2016, 
Borgohain et 
al., 2015, 
Ghildiyal et 
al., 2014, 
Karlof and 
Wagner, 
2003) 
Target tracking  
(Ning et 
al., 2015) 
  
Traceability 
attack 
Traceability attacks pose a 
threat to the privacy of users 
carrying the compromised 
IoT device. 
(Bu et al., 
2017) 
  
Unavailability 
of 
Privacy-preserving methods 
are open issues in IoT 
(Mayer, 
2009) 
Physical 
Layer 
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communication 
caused by 
botnets and 
Distributed 
Denial of 
services attacks 
causing communication 
between devices disturbed. 
This often results in Denial 
of Services. 
Data link 
Layer 
Network 
Layer 
Transport 
Layer 
User account 
injection attack 
Attack similar to SQL 
injection but with the user 
account to compromise a 
device. 
(Liu and 
Sun, 2016) 
Application 
layer, 
Presentation, 
Session layer 
(El 
Mouaatamid 
et al., 2016) 
Wormhole 
attack 
The fundamental idea of 
wormhole attack is that two 
or more malicious nodes 
hide the true distances 
among them entice other 
normal nodes to route across 
these dangerous nodes to 
absorb data flow and cause 
network conjunction or 
cooperate with other 
attackers. 
(Sun et al., 
2017b, Du 
and Chen, 
2008) 
Physical 
Layer 
Data link 
layer 
Network 
Layer 
(El 
Mouaatamid 
et al., 2016, 
Pongle and 
Chavan, 
2015, 
Borgohain et 
al., 2015, 
Ghildiyal et 
al., 2014, 
Karlof and 
Wagner, 
2003) 
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The table mentioned above is self-explanatory that series of malicious attacks are targeting IoT.  
Now a day’s most of the security professionals have to defend their organizations from cyber 
criminals trying continuously to steal the wealth of public or private information. This 
information can be passwords, financial information, health records or anything valuable. 
Attackers reap the benefits of their malicious intent by trying and infecting more and more 
resources, for example, email servers, databases, surveillance camera, search engines, 
corporate servers and use them as sources to cause more damage. No matter, what’s the intent, 
cybercrime cannot be started or completed without a malware. Nowadays, malware 
development is an industry where the author’s contribution is only to write the code and get 
their share, a team of criminal marketers does rest of the job.  
There is no such thing like 100% security or safety, as soon as billions of interconnected IoT 
devices join the network, they get a gift of associated challenges. These challenges can be of 
any type described in above tables (X, X). Solution to these challenges requires not only human 
efforts but also involve massive investment of resources to mitigate. It is understood that 
malware plays a vital role in the breach of security, privacy, and trust. Therefore, it is necessary 
to study the various aspects of IoT malware to prevent future attacks.  
2.7 –  Overview of malware 
The purpose of this section is to introduce malware analysis, detection approaches and various 
studies aiming to perform the proposed research, i.e. malware analysis, detection and 
classification.  
2.7.1 What is malware?  
Malware is a menace to the society, in other words, an adverse use of application development 
aiming to harm the general public and organization. There are various definitions of malware, 
but in simple words, it is a negative programming force that is being used for destructive 
purposes by cybercriminals. Software developed by certain individuals and spread by one or 
many with intentions to cause loss of money, reputation and grievance to the people or 
organizations.  
2.7.2 Characteristics of malware and its variants 
Malware has various characteristics could be referred as deception/destruction capabilities, but 
following four features make them more harmful: (i) Stealthy behavior; (ii) poly/metamorphic 
nature; (iii) armor capabilities; (iv) obfuscation of code (Chen et al., 2012). 
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Stealthy behavior: This characteristic makes it capable of hiding the system activities 
while during infection and later stages.  During stealth, process attacker tries to control 
by occupying registry and user/system files, etc. Furthermore, once it holds the system 
entirely, it hides itself from system processes to avoid discovery by anti-malware 
software.  
Poly/metamorphic nature of malware:  A perfect implementation of object-oriented 
programming to implement malware code in such a way that a malware automatically 
creates multiple variants without changing core functionality but targeting different 
victims. In metamorphic malware not only code sequence may be altered dynamically 
but also changes functionalities as well. 
Armor capabilities: A modern-day malware is capable of detecting that someone is 
trying to debug or reverse engineer (a standard function used for this called 
“IsDebuggerPresent” it and automatically goes into an isolation state, this capability 
comes from the fact that they can find whether they are being run in a virtual 
environment like VMWare based virtual machine. Therefore, they hide their actual 
functions, imports, exports and sometimes system calls as well. That makes a malware 
analyst’s job even harder. 
Obfuscation of code: Refers to confuse, mislead, compress, encrypt or decode various 
coding elements of malware to hide their actual functionality and avoid presence in the 
system. 
2.7.3 Malware variants  
Malware has various forms classed into a Botnet, Worm, Ransomware, Rootkit, and Trojan 
(shown in table), each of these families is dangerous enough to cause too much financial loss 
particularly if we talk about Botnets and Ransomware, they are alarmingly dangerous. In 
chapter 1 we discussed the severity of IoT Botnet Mirai which caused above 1TB distributed 
denial of service attack on Dyn and caused over $110 million to the company. Furthermore, 
ransomware can be considered as modern-day kidnaps, kidnapping of highly valuable system 
information and ask for money to release them. 
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Different types of malware 
Malware type Description 
Botnet 
Bots have the ability to compromise one or more machines, use 
them as attack source to target more victim machines. 
Worm 
Worms replicate themselves in a compromised machine by 
disabling security features. 
Ransomware 
Modern-day form of kidnapping and compromising data by 
encrypting it and getting the money to release. 
Rootkit Compromise machines without getting detected. 
Trojan Disguised as a good application to gain access. 
Table 4: Different types of a malware 
 
2.7.4 Malware analysis techniques 
Malware analysis techniques are used to read the patterns of malware by either reading their 
code statically or getting information by executing them (whether it is an isolated/artificial 
environment on live). In general malware analysis techniques can be divided into two 
categories, i.e. (i) static malware analysis; (ii) dynamic malware analysis techniques, but we 
will be dividing dynamic malware analysis into the third one of network traffic analysis 
technique as shown in figure 9 (Damodaran et al., 2017). In static analysis, researchers use two 
approaches to reading the code either by de-compilation /reverse engineering or just with the 
help of some text reading parsers developed using scripting languages like Python, C++ or 
Java. It’s relatively faster and less time-consuming. While dynamic analysis deals with the 
study of malware behavior while executed (Ravula et al., 2011).  
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Figure 10: A structural explanation of malware analysis 
 
Both static and dynamic methods are cost-effective and accurate like others both of these 
techniques have their pros and cons. For example, when researchers started analyzing malware, 
malware authors began obfuscating the malware to hide malicious intentions and making static 
analysis hard to perform (Borello and Mé, 2008). Nowadays, polymorphism and 
metamorphism are the familiar concepts those used in malware creation with the purpose of 
deception, code reuse, and faster penetration. Table 8 shows some features of static malware. 
Malware investigation is always performed in a controlled environment either with the help of 
some specialized sandboxes or some virtual machines to avoid infection to other machines 
(Wrench and Irwin, 2015). For the scope of this document, we will be focusing on only static 
malware analysis. 
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2.8- Machine Learning 
In the field of computer sciences machine learning is a sub-branch of artificial intelligence that 
uses the algorithms to automate the analytics. Application of machine learning is everywhere 
and there is a possibility that you have been using it without knowing anything about it, e.g. to 
find out daily trends of stock in the stock market, another example is biomedical research where 
expression of some medical concept can be studied, etc. Mostly machine learning is applied in 
those research areas where future prediction is required by previously held information to 
improve the performance of existing software solutions.   
The used algorithms in machine learning can be either supervised or unsupervised. When the 
dataset is labeled then supervised learning is used. In supervised learning dataset, each 
algorithm has a common principal, i.e. “predictive modeling” that model the data to find the 
trends or structure of the data to make predictions. Algorithms used in supervised learning are 
also known as classifiers or classification algorithms. Whereas, in unsupervised learning, the 
dataset is unlabeled and there is no target class defined that helps to discover the unknown 
classes. Algorithms used in unsupervised learning are known as regression algorithms.  
For data analysis where a target class is present classification algorithms are mainly used. The 
following table shows the most commonly used classification algorithms. 
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Table 5: Machine learning algorithms and their purpose 
Algorithm Purpose 
Bayesian Network 
Probabilistic/statistical modeling in complex or uncertain 
cases, fast analytical response, support best decision 
analysis, possibility to use information from different 
sources for analysis (Uusitalo, 2007).  
Decision tree (C4.5) 
Builds decisions like a tree, feature selection, 
classification (with minimum effort), easy interpretation 
of results, handles both continuous and discrete 
attributes, handles missing values, Prunes tree once 
created (Ali et al., 2012). 
Chi-square Automatic 
Interaction Detector 
Classification/prediction, interaction between variables, 
easy implementation/interpretation, non-parametric, 
powerful/quicker and cost effective (Rygielski et al., 
2002). 
Classification and 
Regression Trees 
Good for both classification and regression analysis 
avoid data exhaustion 
Decision Stump 
One level decision tree, discriminates between two of 
three classes, help ensembles 
Gradient Boosting 
Good for both classification and regression, used for 
ensemble learning, boost weaker models. 
High-Performance 
Neural 
High-performance analytical procedure, runs on 
single/distributed modes, utilizes all available system 
cores and threads. 
K-Nearest Neighbor 
Pattern recognition, used for both classification and 
regression, from multiple points of multiple classes 
separate a new class. 
Least Absolute 
Shrinkage and 
Selection Operator 
Variable selection, regularization, enhance prediction 
accuracy, interpretable results and to reduce overfitting 
(Tibshirani, 1996). 
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Least Angle Regression 
Fast forward feature selection, stepwise regression 
model, computationally fast, simple, cross-validation, 
identify possible correlation (EFRON et al., 2004). 
Linear Regression 
Prediction/forecasting, error reduction, to explain data, 
its relationship between a dependent variable and 
multiple independent variables. 
Logistic Regression 
To describe data, the relationship between one binary 
target and one or more other variables including 
categorical variables. 
Naive Bayes 
A family of classifiers, provide high scalability, so simple 
to implement, statistically independent classification. 
Neural Network 
Multilayer Perception 
Three layer neural network, helps to distinguish from 
inseparable data, capable to stochastically solve machine 
learning problems. 
Neural Network 
Multilayer Perception 
Back Propagation 
Most general, to calculate gradients, simplest, for non-
linear approximation, the minimum value of error 
function is looked. 
Partial Least Squares 
Predicted modeling, help overfitting, feature reduction 
(Tobias, 1995). 
Random Forest 
The ensemble of classification and regression, form 
multiple trees, flexible, best results, no need to tune 
parameters, select the best feature, overfitting, outlier 
detection and variable priority (Ali et al., 2012). 
Stepwise Regression 
Automatic independent feature selection, stepwise 
removal of predictors to build regression model (Lewis, 
2007). 
Support Vector 
Machine 
Work well in high dimensional spaces, risk minimization, 
handle overfitting, the margin of separation, where no. of 
dimensions > samples, memory efficiency (Schwarm and 
Ostendorf, 2005). 
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Malware detection and role of machine learning 
Tradional malwares are a history, it is a time in which highly-sophisticated malware attacks 
are happening specially when the importance of IoT devices is growing day by day, various 
research studies have been conducted on malware analysis, but still, continuous threats were 
coming up every day. So, researchers started involving machine learning to study the different 
aspects of malware. It is important to note that till this date there has been no evidence of 
research on IoT malware analysis with the help of machine learning. The behaviour of both 
IoT and non-IoT malware is still un-tested.  
With the help of machine learning algorithms, it is possible to learn the pattern of new and old 
malware, prediction of further attacks and enhancing the malware detection systems.   
Traditional malware detection systems and intrusion detection systems used both signature-
based analysis and anomaly-based malware detection. Anomaly-based detection uses behavior 
patterns from network traffic. Both of these methods again have strengths and weaknesses 
covered in the dynamic analysis. Dynamic malware investigation is time-consuming and slow. 
Besides weaknesses of both static and dynamic, they are effectively used along with supervised 
and unsupervised learning models. Machine learning in malware detection helps in predicting 
abnormal patterns in an efficient way which saves computational overheads. It also describes 
the quality of the classifier on given circumstances and its ability to detect outliers (Srndic and 
Laskov, 2016). Most popular classification methods include Neural Network, Support Vector 
Machine, Decision Tree, and Random Forest, also shown in our classifier selection in the figure 
and table 6 shows a summary of the literature of malware analysis with machine learning.  
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Table 6: Overview of literature concerning different platforms, their features extracted, 
classifiers and accuracies about static malware analysis 
Reference Platform 
No. of  
Malware 
No. of 
Benign 
Feature Extracted Classifier Accuracy 
(Wang et al., 
2016a) 
Android 20045 20023 Meta data 1,2,3,4,5 94 
(Lo et al., 2016b) Windows 7630 1818 
Static (File Info, version, 
properties, 
PE Info, metadata, 
behavioral info) 
1,5,6 99.6 
(Kühnel and 
Meyer, 2016) 
Mobile 2441 4539 Character set 5, 7, 4,1,2 90+ 
(Kang et al., 2015) Android 4554 51179 
APIs, Permissions, serial 
number of certificate 
2 90 
(Ding et al., 2016) Windows 2000 2000 Opcode (n-grams) 5, 7, 4 96.2 
(Cepeda et al., 
2016) 
Windows 7630 1818 
Static (File Info, version, 
properties, 
PE Info, metadata, 
behavioral info) 
1,5,6 99.6 
(Baldangombo et 
al., 2013) 
Windows 236756 10592 Header, DLLs, API calls, 5, 8, 2 99.6 
(Santos et al., 
2013a) 
Windows 13189 13000 Opcodes 
7,8,5 
1, 2,9 
95.90 
(Islam et al., 
2013a) 
Windows 2398 2008 
Function length frequency 
vectors, Printable Strings 
5, 4,1,10 87.81 
(Kolter and 
Maloof, 2004) 
Windows 1651 1971 Byte sequences 
2,4,5,11,12,13, 
14,15 
- 
(Milosevic et al.) Android 200 200 
Permissions and source 
code 
1,2,5,16,17,18 95.6 
(Nath and Mehtre, 
2014b) 
Windows 9458 123 Image Visualisation 7 98.08 
(Yuan et al., 2016) Android 1760 20000 
Permissions, file contents, 
API 
6 96.76 
(Adebayo et al., 
2014) 
Android 1000 500 Byte code 19 97.20 
(Fereidooni et al., 
2016) 
Android 18677 11187 
Intents, used permissions, 
APIs, IMEI 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 97.30 
Key: 1= Random Forest, 2=Naïve Bayes, 3=Logistic Regression, 4=Decision Tree, 5=Support Vector Machine, 6=Neural Network, 7=K-
Nearest Neighbour, 8=Decision Tree (J48), 9= Bayesian Network, 10=IB1, 11=IBK, 12=Boosted naive Bayes, 13=boosted SVM, 
14=Boosted decision trees, 15=TFIDF, 16=C4.5 Decision Tree, 17=JRip, 18=AdaBoost, 19=Association rule 
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Static malware analysis 
Since smart devices have emerged in the industry particularly mobile phones, their security 
issues increased as well. People use these devices to store historical data, passwords, contacts, 
picture, videos, account information and much more valuable information (Arzt et al., 2014). 
To understand the threats related to mobile devices, their analysis (static) and application of 
machine learning. We selected papers from ISI Web of Science database from 2010-2017. 
Table 9 presents information about various static features related to mobile research. Our 
chosen articles were consisting of Android mobile devices which is one of the most extensive 
mobile operating system in the market (Atwal). 
In addition to the growing importance of Android devices, people tend to analyze loopholes 
behind these devices. Malware authors create malware targeting weaknesses of these devices 
and steal sensitive information from these devices. Recent studies show that mobile devices 
mainly android platform are the prime targets of attackers (Symantec, 2017). An example of a 
simplest everyday attack, if someone’s mobile gets compromised and gets charged for sending 
premium rate messages then this becomes a serious issue, malware detection is a serious 
concern for not only the general public but for organizations as well using Android devices to 
control IoT devices. 
Further to our current discussion, Table 9 illustrates a list of some important static features and 
few relevant articles in which these features have been used. These selected articles also apply 
machine learning classifiers to them and explain various performance measure which we will 
explain later on. Here we will discuss two important papers regarding static feature extraction, 
classification, and efficient detection mechanism. One article is ANASTASIA, a framework 
which analyses various static features including API calls, IMEI addresses, malicious 
intentions and user permissions. ANASTASIA performs classification using important 
classifiers, e.g. SVM, KNN, DT, NB, Boosting techniques and Deep Learning as well. Along 
with this author also handle imbalanced dataset which now a day’s researchers ignore to 
analyze. As a result of classification, we can get the accuracy of 97.3%, the reason to choose 
this paper is that it performs various performance measures include Accuracy, TPR, FPR, 
Precision, Recall, and F1-score, etc.   
Another example of an excellent paper, Droid Api Miner (Aafer et al., 2013) performed static 
malware analysis using features like API calls, Opcodes extracted from Byte Code, etc. and 
uses DT, C4.5 DT, KNN, and linear SVM as classifiers resulting in an accuracy of 99%. These 
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continuously growing research trends are because of its enormous importance in IoT domain, 
and the majority of Android apps are free of charge.   
Feature extraction and current literature 
Feature 
extracted 
Reference 
API 
(Cho et al., 2017, Kang et al., 2015, Dhaya et al., 2014, 
Fereidooni et al., 2016, Geneiatakis et al., 2015, Yerima et al., 
2015b) 
Strings (Cho et al., 2017, Sanz et al., 2013) 
Bytes (Santos et al., 2011, Adebayo et al., 2014) 
URL (Thomas et al., 2011) 
Permissions 
(Xu et al., 2013, Kim et al., 2015, Kang et al., 2015, Fereidooni 
et al., 2016, Geneiatakis et al., 2015, Su et al., 2016b, Su et al., 
2016a, Feizollah et al., 2017, Lopez and Cadavid, 2016, 
Akhuseyinoglu and Akhuseyinoglu, 2016, Yerima et al., 2015b) 
Java code (Feizollah et al., 2017) 
Network address (Feizollah et al., 2017) 
Hardware components (Feizollah et al., 2017) 
Intent filters 
(Fereidooni et al., 2016, Su et al., 2016b, Su et al., 2016a, 
Feizollah et al., 2017, Yerima et al., 2015b) 
User flow (Brown et al., 2016) 
Opcode (Damodaran et al., 2017) 
Table 7: Showing static features extracted in various literature 
Feature selection methods in machine learning 
The discussion on machine learning and classification algorithms will be incomplete without 
discussion of feature selection methods. Therefore, for our research as well, this is an important 
step. When performing malware analysis and feature list is too big, it is important to reduce the 
features to a minimum set without compromising the performance of classification algorithms 
being used and making analysis process smooth. It will not be wrong if we say that in majority 
of instances least the features are higher will be the detection rate, and overall accuracy of the 
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algorithms. Furthermore, it is also important for forensic experts to put more focus on important 
features filtered out during process of feature selection. 
For background knowledge of feature selection methods, we used comprehensive literature 
review on feature selection methods being used in the literature and summarised our findings 
in the tables below. Table 8 shows various feature selection methods used in diverse literature. 
This table can used to compare the methods used in the literature and our contribution towards 
feature selection methods.  
Feature selection methods used in literature 
Method Reference 
Information Gain (Akhuseyinoglu and Akhuseyinoglu, 2016) 
Gain ratio (Yerima et al., 2015b, Yerima et al., 2015a) 
Chi-square 
(Feng et al., 2017, Lopez and Cadavid, 2016) 
(Akhuseyinoglu and Akhuseyinoglu, 2016) 
Association rule with apriori algorithm (Adebayo et al., 2014) 
Ensemble of randomized decision tree (Fereidooni et al., 2016) 
Fischer score (Cohen et al., 2016) 
Top feature (Cohen et al., 2016) 
Deep belief network (Yuan et al., 2016) 
Table 8: Showing various feature selection method 
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Performance measures of Static malware analysis 
In this section, we will discuss various performance measures widely used in the literature by 
the researchers to predict the performance of classification algorithms, for example, better the 
accuracy of an algorithm, better would be the power of differentiation between malware and 
benign application. We are listing standard performance measures and their formulas in table 
10 below. In Table 10 and 11, some recent papers have been mentioned with their performance 
measures and formulas to calculate them. TP represents a malware correctly identified, FP 
represents a goodware correctly identified, TN and FN are the false alarms of both malware 
and goodware wrongly identified. To conclude the discussion on performance measures, we 
can say that these measures play an important role in evaluating the work. 
Performance Measure Formula 
TPR or Sensitivity TP/(TP+FN) 
FPR or (1-TNR) TN/(TN+FP) 
TNR or Specificity FP/(FP+TN) 
FNR FN/(FN+TP) 
Accuracy (TP+TN)/(TP+TN+FP+FN) 
Precision TP/(TP+FP) 
Recall TP/(TP+FN) 
F1-score (2 x TPR x Precision) / (TPR + Precision) 
Table 9: Showing performance evaluation measures used in this study 
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Important classifiers employed in the literature 
Reference Classifier TPR FPR AUC ACC 
(Wang et al., 2016a, 
Wang et al., 2016d) 
 
Naïve Bayes 0.77 0.07 0.92 85 
Bayesian Network 0.87 0.08 0.96 89 
Support Vector Machine 0.92 0.07 0.92 92 
Logistic Regression 0.90 0.07 0.97 91 
Decision Tree with J48 0.92 0.06 0.96 93 
Random Forest 0.94 0.05 0.98 94 
(Santos et al., 2013a, 
Santos et al., 2013b) 
Support Vector Machine x 0.02 0.95 95.90 
K-Nearest Neighbour 0.95 0.05 0.95 94.83 
Decision Tree 0.93 0.08 0.93 92.61 
Random Forest 0.96 0.06 0.99 95.26 
Naïve Bayes 0.90 0.10 0.93 90.02 
Bayesian Network 0.91 0.04 0.98 93.40 
(Feng et al., 2017) V-SVM 0.91 18.21 0.9643 91.29 
(Yerima et al., 2015a) 
Decision Trees 0.95 0.04 0.964 95.4 
Random Trees 0.96 0.04 0.960 95.9 
Naïve Bayes 0.82 0.08 0.88 91.5 
Random Forest 0.97 0.02 0.992 97.4 
(Cohen et al., 2016) Random Forest 0.97 0.05 0.9927 97 
Table 10: Recent papers and their performance measures 
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Preventive approaches to cope with malware attacks on IoT 
Possible prevention is to know what kind of malware attacking, knowing the characteristics 
Due to the scope of this report, we will only be discussing one static malware analysis. Future 
works may involve addressing other challenges as well. 
The conclusion of literature review 
The literature review showed us that in static malware analysis sufficient work in being done 
in Windows and Android-based environments but there is no work done in the field of IoT 
malware analysis (Please note: with IoT malware analysis we mean malware analysis of 
information obtained from IoT). Further to this, there is a need to address efficient malware 
detection system by calculating misclassification cost, class imbalance, and optimization of 
used classifiers, we aim to cover these issues with the help of cost-sensitive learning. Various 
classifiers and feature selection methods have been used for malware classification and 
prediction using WEKA and Matlab. However, we opted to use SAS Enterprise Miner 14.2 
(latest version) for the classification and feature selection. Because of being a licensed 
software, researchers usually do not often use this software but still an excellent software. This 
research will be giving us a chance to evaluate this software and pinpoint pros and cons of this 
software.  
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Chapter 3: Research methodology 
3.1 - The proposed research stages 
A pilot study has been performed and proposed research stages consist of six main activities 
of data collection, feature extraction, feature selection and evaluation, classification, test and 
generalization check. The figure below represents all of these stages.  
 
Figure 11: Research proposed framework 
3.2.  Data collection 
This section presents the process of data collection and feature extraction. Collected a sample 
dataset of 1102 IoT ELF malware downloaded from VXHeaven, having a class of UNIX 
System V and platforms. A total of 1083 clean application (ARM) collected using Qemu 
emulator from the Raspbian operating system. Figure 12 shows both malware and goodware 
samples. 
In total, there are 2085 files, these malware from various platform help us to test issues like 
class imbalance and generalization of the algorithms. Using a controlled environment, all clean 
applications were analyzed via VT to check the possibility of being infectious, ignored some 
so-called clean applications downloaded from Contigo website found infected while scanning 
through VT. Some of the malware were found to be packed with UPX packer while analyzing 
them VT (Cross checked using our selected DE complier-IDA Pro 6.9), unpacked them with 
the corresponding unpacker downloaded from UPX website. 
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Figure 12: Data collection process 
3.3. Feature extraction 
After malwares get checked up for packing/unpacking issues, next step is feature extraction. 
“ReadELF” a python script (A static feature extraction script) was used to extract features from 
each malware and goodware, and the data was cross-checked with three static feature extraction 
tools in Linux called “ReadELF,” “ObjDump” and “ELFParser.” Table 12 shows datasets 
created after features extraction. 
3.3.1.  Datasets created 
During data collection process, following datasets were generated, some of these datasets are 
complete and operational, and some are requiring further processing for example segment 
headers, functions, imports, and exports. Table 12 shows the list of datasets created in this 
research. 
  
VT Scanning for Infectious Entries 
Sample Dataset 
IoT ELF malware (1102) 
 
 
 
Class: UNIX system V 
 
VXHeaven 
Downloaded 
 
Sample Dataset 
IoT ELF goodware (1083) 
 
 
 
Class: UNIX system V 
 
Raspbian operating system 
Downloaded 
 
107 | P a g e  
 
Datasets created  
Feature set Disassembled? features Stage 
File header No 33 Done 
Program header No 10 Done 
Section header No 18 Done 
Segment header Yes 15 Future work 
Symbol table No 7 Future work 
Strings No 5 Future work 
Function Yes 10 Future work 
Process names Yes 5 Future work 
Imports Yes 5 Future work 
Exports Yes 5 Future work 
Table 11: Datasets created 
3.4 - Feature selection and evaluation 
During our discussion about Machine learning in section 2.8, we discussed about feature 
selection and evaluation and presented a table in which various feature selection methods were 
introduced in almost all studies related to malware analysis. As stated previously, our purpose 
is to give readers an overview of some of the existing feature selection methods and use some 
additional methods which were never used in any of the research related to malware analysis 
which gives approximately zero percent possibility of use in IoT research. 
The process of feature selection is used to perform dimension reduction of malware dataset and 
makes data easier to analyse.  Data analysis with a vast amount of data requires more 
computational resources and a considerable amount of time. So, feature selection lets us 
remove noisy/useless features without losing efficiency and improves results. In our research 
we aim to select best feature selection methods to support our framework. 
Our feature selection process includes the application of principal component analysis, using 
linear/logistic regression, decision trees, variable selection, variable clustering, statistics 
explorer methods backed by some additional feature selection methods applied using SAS 
Enterprise Miner 14.2 shown in table 14. Furthermore, our aim to use these feature selection 
methods as an input to our classifiers using same binary target variable and compare the list of 
selected features and find out best selector. In section 3.5- Figure 13 shows the proposed 
process of feature selection. 
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Figure 13: Feature selection process used in this dissertation 
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Our proposed feature selection methods 
Feature selection method Process 
R-square Statistics explorer 
Chi-square Statistics explorer 
R-square and Chi-square-both  Statistics explorer 
Fast Selection  Variable selection 
Least angle regression (LAR) Variable selection 
LASSO Variable selection 
Variable correlation PCA 
Full feature selection Regression 
Stepwise feature selection Regression 
Backward feature selection Regression 
Forward feature selection Regression 
Fast backward feature selection Regression 
Decision tree Decision trees 
Table 12: Feature selection methods  
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3.5.  Classification 
Data classification is supervised learning technique in which there is a predefined target 
variable (In our case we have binary target also known as a positive class, represented by 0 for 
goodware and 1 for malware), in classification the original dataset was subdivided into training, 
test and validate having size 40%, 30%, and 30%.  It helped us to determine the performance 
measures by calculating Accuracy of Classification Rate, the Area Under the Curve, Precision, 
Recall, and F1-score. For classification, the approach used contains process of importing a file, 
impute variables, pass variables to feature selection algorithms, apply classification algorithms 
and compare results. Figure 14 shows a list of our selected classifiers. During the classification 
process our aim was to apply classification/feature selection methods that have been used in 
the recent literature and available in SAS enterprise miner.   
In machine learning we use multiple algorithms to perform spot checking on the dataset. The 
purpose of spot checking is to not only perform which algorithms performs well in the dataset 
which you do not know beforehand. To achieve better spot checking results, researchers use 
various kinds of algorithms with various implementations like trees, instances, linear or non-
linear etc (Brownlee, 2016). Because datasets were created with the information extracted from 
malware full categorical values that is why we had to do spot checking for each dataset. 
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Figure 14: Machine learning classifiers used in our approach 
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3.6. Further experiments on the algorithms 
During the process of classification, there are two important checks to be considered, to see 
whether (1) classifier is generalized? (2) Not overfitting? If overfitting, consider hyper tuning 
the parameters and find an optimized parameter. To check generalization, another dataset is 
being created which will contain malware samples to be checked for generalization. For 
example, our malware dataset consists of malware from advanced micro devices, INTEL 
80386, X86-64, SPARC, MIPS and MC63000, same malware in a fraction present in primary 
dataset as well to train the classifiers.  
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Chapter 4: Results and discussion 
This chapter presents the results of the current analysis. In section 3.4 we discussed the feature 
selection methods and classifiers used in our investigation. This chapter aims to present a quick 
look at feature selection results of the main header, program header, and section header 
features.  
Feature worth 
Figure 15 shows feature worth for the main header about the binary target variable category 
(category “1” represents malware and “0” represents benign app). As shown in the figure, the 
variables from sh4 onwards (includes many flag variables) can be ignored and may have next 
to none impact on the classification process. 
Figure 16, shows variable worth for program header and indicates that only three flag variables 
containing malware or goodware access permissions have the least importance. These variables 
(Read, Write and Execute) can be dropped. 
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Figure 15: Main header variable worth 
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Figure 16: Program header variable worth 
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Similar kind of information can be seen in figure 15 for section headers. All binary flag 
variables have least worth. The variable of sh_size (size of current section header) and all 
flag variables can be ignored. In future investigations as shown in previous sections, we will 
try comparing various feature selection methods, group the results obtained from those 
methods using parameters in table 15 and feed them to the classifiers.  
Feature combining rules 
Any Any variable rejected by any of the feature selection methods will be ignored. 
All Variables rejected by all feature selection methods will be ignored. 
Majority Variable rejected by the majority of the feature selection methods will be ignored. 
Table 13: Feature combining rules 
In each dataset, Roc chart, output, and fit statistics were calculated for training, validation and 
test datasets with partitioning size of 40%, 30%, and 30% respectively. 
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Figure 17: Section header variable worth 
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Malware classification and discussion of results. 
For IoT malware classification, we used 20 classifiers on 3 datasets i.e. program header, main 
header and section header. Our results shown that each classifier gives different attributes of 
performance accuracies for the malware classification and prediction. Some of them performed 
very well and some of them did not. This situation prompts us to categories these classifiers in 
to 4 groups on the basis of their percentage of accuracy i.e. Group A (>=94%),  
Group B (>=90%), Group C (>=80%) and Group D (<80%). In chapter-2 section 2.8, we 
summarized 15 published studies in Table 6, where classification was performed on Windows 
and Android based malware and goodware. Although there is no study published on IoT 
malware classification but it will be useful to compare our results with previously published 
studies.  
There are five key findings from our research and key issues it raises for future malware 
analysis. First key finding by comparison of 20 different classifiers for IoT malware analysis 
was noted that Random forest outclassed all results with maximum performance in all datasets. 
This finding when comparing with previous studies, it has been noted that (Lo et al., 2016a, 
Baldangombo et al., 2013) and (Cepeda et al., 2016)  also identified the highest performance 
(99.6%) with Random forest, although that classification was for Windows based malware. 
This finding justifies that Random Forest gives the best performance on IoT malware 
classification. However, an interesting thing was noted that (Lo et al., 2016b) and (Cepeda et 
al., 2016) used imbalanced dataset and did not specify the sampling method used for the 
classification, therefore, their accuracies may be overestimated. The same finding was 
observed in all the previous studies (Baldangombo et al., 2013, Nath and Mehtre, 2014a, Yuan 
et al., 2016) i.e. imbalanced dataset and their accuracies were over 98%.  This indicates an 
unaddressed issue in these published articles. However, our datasets were balanced datasets 
with higher accuracies. 
Second finding from our results is that hyper parameter tuning also effect the accuracy of 
classifiers. It was achieved by changing parameter and with the help of different kernels.  For 
example, classification was performed by changing the attributes of the classifiers. In our study 
neural network was used with three different kernels: (i) High performance neural, (ii) 
Multilayer perception, and (iii) Multilayer perception back propagation. High performance 
neural shown slightly better performance for main header dataset of 99.85%, in section headers 
and program header, this classifier showed decrease in performance to 93.37% and 90.79%.  
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Figure 18: Main header ROC Chart 
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Figure 19: Program header ROC Chart 
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Figure 20: Section header ROC Chart  
123 | P a g e  
 
Multilayer perception and Back propagation shown better performance in program header. No 
published article specified this attribute to address performance related issues to help malware 
analysis. In main header all three of these variants of neural network were placed in Group A. 
In comparison to this Neural Network was used with default parameters in (Fereidooni et al., 
2016, Lo et al., 2016a) but parameters or kernels were not specified. Three variants of tree 
algorithms were used and as predicted they performed well in all datasets.  
In Group A, main header and section header datasets had Chi-Square Automatic Interaction 
Detection, C4.5, CART and Decision Stump (A tree with MAX Depth=1) but in program 
header decision stump was the least performing classifier and we placed it in Group D. In 
comparison to this, in reviewed articles (Wang et al., 2016b, Kuhnel et al., 2016, Baldangombo 
et al., 2013, Santos et al., 2011, Islam et al., 2013b, Milosevic et al., 2017, Fereidooni et al., 
2016) decision tree was used along with two different tree variants i.e. J48, C4.5. C4.5.  
Furthermore, in terms of future research, it was observed in this study that in training, test and 
validations all three datasets had similar behavior and had a similar ROC chart a straight line 
(in main header due to accuracies 100%) but a curve in program and section header. Our model 
comparison process shown that all algorithms had a closer performance except decision stump. 
Our ROC chart was a plot between True Positive Rate (TPR) and False Positive Rate (FPR) 
which we derived from Table 9 showing performance measures. Figures 19, 20, and 21 show 
the charts showing the positive likelihood of predicting a malware. Our classifiers had a 
positive prediction power of 100% using Group A classifier in main header and in over 94% 
in case of program header and section header. We can predict another thing from our ROC 
curve that closer the chart from left hand corner higher would be the accuracy which is apparent 
from these three figures. When this curve passes through top left corner then we can also 
conclude that both percentages of specificity and sensitivity are equal to 100%.    
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Dataset Classifier Accuracy AUC Precision Recall 
F1-
score 
Program 
header 
Random Forest 94.36 0.988 0.96 0.76 0.85 
Main 
header 
Least Angle Regression 100.00 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Least Absolute Shrinkage and 
Selection Operator 
100.00 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
C4.5 100.00 0.997 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Chi-square automatic interaction 
detection 
100.00 0.997 0.98 1.00 0.99 
Decision Stump 100.00 0.997 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Random Forest 100.00 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Partial Least Squares 100.00 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
SVM Activeset RBF 100.00 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
SVM Activeset Polynomial 100.00 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Gradient Boosting 100.00 0.997 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Classification and Regression 
Trees 
99.85 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
HP Neural 99.85 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
KNN 99.85 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Bayesian Network 99.85 1 0.98 1.00 0.99 
Naive Bayes 99.85 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Linear Regression 99.69 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Logistic Regression 99.69 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
NN Multilayer Perception 99.08 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
NN Multilayer Perception Back 
Propagation 
99.08 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Section 
header 
Random Forest 98.34 0.999 0.98 0.98 0.98 
KNN 97.84 0.999 0.96 0.98 0.97 
Gradient Boosting 96.96 0.997 0.98 0.93 0.96 
Classification and Regression 
Trees 
96.9 0.99 0.97 0.94 0.96 
Chi-square automatic interaction 
detection 
96.89 0.995 0.95 0.94 0.94 
C4.5 96.47 0.995 0.95 0.95 0.95 
NN Multilayer Perception 95.87 0.994 0.81 0.99 0.89 
NN MLP BK Propagation 94.05 0.988 0.85 0.97 0.90 
Table 14: Shows the performance measures of different classifiers belong to Group A 
Another finding from our results was that in program headers three classifiers C4.5, CHAID, 
and CART had best performance of 93.08%, 92.84% and 92.49% respectively. Comparing this 
to our results reviewed articles used just simple Decision Tree and C4.5 and in terms of 
performance, we seen slightly better performance, but in the articles where performance was 
better (97.30%, 95.6%, 96.2%, and 94%) the feature set were entirely different in nature and it 
was not even closer. One result was 87.81% but majority of these literature used Random Forest 
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as well which has been observed to give best results. Therefore, we had a chance of getting 
better performance in Group B as well with our tree-based classifiers.   
Table 15: Shows the performance measures of different classifiers belong to Group B 
 
  
Dataset Classifier Accuracy AUC Precision Recall 
F1-
score 
Program 
header 
C4.5 93.08 0.966 0.96 0.76 0.85 
Chi-square Automatic 
Interaction Detection 
92.84 0.972 0.93 0.81 0.86 
Classification and Regression 
Trees 
92.49 0.971 0.94 0.81 0.87 
NN MLP BK Propagation 92.41 0.958 0.99 0.66 0.79 
NN Multi-Layer Perception 92.17 0.963 0.99 0.68 0.81 
SVM active set RBF 91.03 0.949 0.96 0.83 0.89 
SVM active set Polynomial 90.97 0.934 0.99 0.68 0.81 
HP Neural 90.79 0.921 0.98 0.51 0.67 
Stepwise Regression 90.79 0.92 0.99 0.68 0.81 
Linear Regression 90.79 0.92 0.98 0.67 0.80 
Logistic Regression 90.79 0.92 0.99 0.68 0.81 
LARS 90.54 0.914 0.99 0.69 0.81 
LASSO 90.54 0.914 0.62 0.93 0.74 
Partial Least Squares 90.20 0.913 0.98 0.67 0.80 
Section 
header 
SVM Active set 
POLYNOMIAL 
93.61 0.987 0.94 0.89 0.91 
Linear Regression 93.46 0.988 0.93 0.91 0.92 
Logistic Regression 93.46 0.988 0.95 0.96 0.96 
HP Neural 93.37 0.988 0.92 0.90 0.91 
Stepwise Regression 93.31 0.987 0.92 0.90 0.91 
Bayesian Network 92.45 0.986 0.92 0.90 0.91 
SVM Active set RBF 92.36 0.982 0.91 0.88 0.90 
LASSO 92.26 0.984 0.90 0.89 0.89 
Least Angle Regression 92.25 0.984 0.90 0.89 0.89 
Partial Least Squares 92.17 0.984 0.91 0.88 0.89 
Naive Bayes 90.73 0.985 0.92 0.90 0.91 
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Stepwise regression was the only one classifier in main header was the worst performing 
classifier with 50% accuracy, which may be due to nature of the data and opens doors for 
further studies. We could clearly see the curve was away from upper left corner and the Point 
of Compromise (POC) between sensitivity and specificity was smaller. Our worst-case 
scenario was too far away from POC and could be seen as a straight line in ROC curve near 
baseline. 
Dataset Classifier Accuracy AUC Precision Recall F1-score 
Program header 
Gradient Boosting 88.84 0.951 0.93 0.66 0.77 
Bayesian Network 86.16 0.96 0.70 0.89 0.78 
Decision Stump 86.00 0.756 0.94 0.77 0.85 
Naive Bayes 83.71 0.935 0.66 0.85 0.75 
KNN 81.97 0.952 0.99 0.69 0.81 
Section Header Decision Stump 87.35 0.823 0.98 0.67 0.80 
Table 16: Shows the performance measures of different classifiers belong to Group C 
Dataset Classifier Accuracy AUC Precision Recall F1-score 
Main header Stepwise regression 50.38 0.5 0.50 1.00 0.67 
Table 17: Shows the performance measures of different classifiers belong to Group D 
Furthermore, our feature selection methods outclassed reviewed articles as in all three of our 
datasets the majority of our classifiers were in Group A or B in fact more in Group A. Keeping 
feature scoring in views, features with least weightage were dropped from analysis to observe 
the classifier performance and we noticed that there was no difference in performance of 
classifiers. Our research was first research to combine feature selection methods to experience 
difference in results. 
Overall finding from published literature shown that majority of the articles did not explain 
individual accuracies including our list of performance measures and just specified overall 
accuracy which is insufficient to compare with our results. 
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Chapter 5: Future work and achievements 
In the future, our research will be expanded to develop further a robust IoT security framework 
based on analysis of malware attacking IoT networks. In this regard, efforts would be made to 
propose a preventive approach to cope with future security, privacy, and trust related threats. 
 
We identify a few open research directions listed below to help us extend the research in this 
dissertation. 
 
1. To perform further experiments on datasets created. 
2. Application of machine learning on following data sets. 
Feature set features 
Segment header 15 
Symbol table 7 
Strings 5 
Function 10 
Process names 5 
Imports 5 
Exports 5 
 
3. Text mining of malware string, symbols, functions, imports, and exports. 
4. The creation of physical IoT network and analysis of network traffic with/without 
malicious activities. 
5. The creation of network simulation of IoT network and comparison of network traffic 
data analysis with physical network data analysis and propose a preventive framework. 
6. To perform more in-depth research on identified security, privacy and trust challenges 
and malware attacks. 
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Achievements 
The purpose of this section is to explain work done till the time of assessment. 
Table 11 illustrates datasets created to support our static malware analysis process. In addition 
to this table 14 shows sample strings to give an idea about the string dataset. Following are the 
achievements at this stage. 
1. Datasets including file header, program header and section header, strings and symbol table 
are 100% complete.  
2. Paper for malware classification using file header, program header, and section header has 
been written. Results have been compiled as well, and I am currently addressing some 
questions raised by the supervisors.  
3. Another paper that includes only symbol table and possibly strings as well is under 
classification phase, for this dataset as a test experiment TF/IDF and PCA were applied size 
of the dataset includes one million symbols from 2185 malware and goodware. Removed 
symbols with 0% frequency to avoid level limitation constraint of the analysis tools. 
(Missing values have been checked as well, need to address some issues with this dataset 
to avoid imbalanced dataset and increase generalization). 
4. Applied text mining on malware/goodware strings and planning to apply sentiment analysis 
to observe some useful insights from strings. During feature extraction process, I 
experienced that there are important strings present in malware like IP Addresses, Ports, 
Linux directory access commands, error messages, abusive words as passwords, default 
passwords, etc. and in goodware nature of the strings present are entirely different. 
Following table 3 represents some strings from malware and goodware datasets. 
5. Other datasets of functions, process names, imports, exports and segment headers were 
extracted using IDA Pro 6.9 Decompiler, requiring some preprocessing and data cleansing. 
(70% work done in those) 
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Table showing sample strings extracted from malware and goodware 
Malware Goodware 
142.54.191.34:23 @Fld 
root $%s, 
admin $Fld%d, 
user $%s) 
login $Fld%d) 
guest = split(/[%c\\n]/, $_, -1);\n 
support = split($FS, $_, -1);\n 
toor = split(' , $_, -1);\n 
changeme 
$FS = 
*+?.[]()|^$\\ 
;\t\t# field separator from -F switch\n 
$FS =  ;\t\t# set field separator\n 
1234 Could not parse message from stdin\n; 
12345 
Show forms dialog options; misc; Miscellaneous 
options; Show miscellaneous options; 
123456 
Zenity;version;3.4.0;copyright;Copyright Â© 
2003 Sun Microsystems; 
default Error showing notification: %s;tooltip;visible; 
password Display;notification;Set the notification text; 
(null) Set dialog timeout in seconds 
buf: %s\n Set step size 
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/bin/sh $, =  ;\t\t# set output field separator\n 
/proc/cpuinfo $\\ = \"\\n\";\t\t# set output record separator\n 
cd /tmp || cd /var/run || cd /mnt || cd 
/root cd /; 
wget http://142.54.191.34/bins.sh; 
chmod 777 bins.sh; 
sh bins.sh; tftp 142.54.191.34 -c get 
tftp1.sh; 
chmod 777 tftp1.sh; sh tftp1.sh; 
tftp -r tftp2.sh -g 142.54.191.34; 
chmod 777 tftp2.sh; sh tftp2.sh; 
ftpget -v -u anonymous -p 
anonymous 
-P 21 142.54.191.34 ftp1.sh ftp1.sh; 
sh ftp1.sh; rm -rf bins.sh tftp1.sh 
tftp2.sh ftp1.sh; 
rm -rf *; exit\r\n 
program is distributed in the hope that it will be 
useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; 
Table 18: Showing sample malware/goodware strings 
Conclusion 
Reaching the final step of this research, many interesting facts were presented not only 
concerning Internet of Things but also with about Malware Analysis and Machine Learning. 
Initially, during comprehensive literature review, it was identified that IoT is a favorite target 
of malware due to the presence of various security, privacy and trust challenges associated with 
IoT ecosystem. We recognized that all of the difficulties discovered contain great possibilities 
for future research. Furthermore, by literature review, it was found that the reason behind the 
statement that “IoT has been a favorite target of malware attacks” was our extracted list of 
malware attacks reported in the literature. Reported evidence states malware analysis a vital 
research area. 
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Talking about research objectives of the thesis, we aimed to discuss IoT with the perspective 
of malware. Therefore, the first objective was to perform a comprehensive literature review on 
IoT to build foundations for conducting the malware analysis on IoT devices. This successfully 
lead us to collect IoT malware and clean samples and perform malware analysis. Our research 
also has shown that due to complex nature of IoT devices, traditional antivirus mechanisms are 
not feasible on IoT and it was needed to conduct malware analysis focusing solely on IoT. Due 
to time constraints, we performed static malware analysis only and results shown that our 
machine learning process returned promising results with above 90% accuracy. Feature 
selection process showed that by removing unnecessary features, we could improve efficiency 
and reduce system overhead. These fewer features also help forensic experts to focus on 
available features as top priority features and investigate further. 
 
Also, best classification results were obtained by using Random Forest. Least performance in 
all three datasets was given by Decision Stump (Decision tree with MAXDEPTH=1), KNN 
and Stepwise Regression. To mention our final suggestion for future research, further analysis 
is required to select best features that can be extracted in a faster manner; it would help to build 
a lightweight embedded program for monitoring suspicious behavior along with 
experimentation on sampling methods on datasets. 
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